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PREFACE
I was fortunate enough to spend the latter part of 1991 and all of 1992 working 
in my native H onduras w ith the double objective of helping the Organization for 
the Entrepreneurial Development of Women (Organizadân de Desarrollo 
Empresarial Femenino—ODEF), a local Non Governmental Organization (NGO) 
plan the creation of the G reen Legacy {Herencia Verde) Center, a Teaching— 
Learning center for sustainable agriculture and environmental education, while, 
at the same time, I gathered information for my professional paper I needed for 
my m aster's degree at the University of M ontana.
My original intention was to w rite my professional paper on the significance 
of a center like Herencia Verde in a tropical rural country such as H onduras. But 
two events m ade me decide otherwise. First, my aunt—the founder and director 
of ODEF—died tragically in an automobile accident on June, 1992. She was the 
soul and driving force not only behind the Flerencia Verde project, bu t behind all 
of ODEF. The Herencia Verde project was throw n off course and de-prioritized 
as the new  ODEF adm inistration took over. Second, during my stay in 
H onduras and as part of the planning process for Herencia Verde, I m ade obser­
vations on the way that governm ent and non-governm ent organizations carried 
out agricultural extension work. I noticed the dichotomy, and even the polarity, 
between m iddle class urban technicians, proud of their knowledge in high-yield 
agricultural techniques, and the "ignorant" poor rural campesinos who had been 
m ade the recipients of those same technologies and strategies that could, pre­
sumably, save the land and themselves. At the same time, I heard of the many 
failures that agricultural projects encountered despite (or as I now believe: be­
cause of) their careful and detailed planning.
m
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s international developm ent organizations, ranging from local 
grassroots groups to large international institutions, have embraced w hat has 
come to be know n as the "new orthodoxy" of developm ent which emphasizes 
"long term, participatory developm ent strategies" (Allen 1990:63). Most 
agricultural developm ent organizations (ADOs)i fully advocate this approach 
centered around com m unity participation. However, the meaning of com m u­
nity participation varies widely among ADOs (Paul 1987) and it is usually defined 
according to the needs, interests and views of each ADO.
Despite the current concern w ith com munity participation, paternalism still 
pervades most international agricultural developm ent work, albeit in a new  and 
more subtle form. This paper will argue that this neo-patem alism  robs benefi­
ciaries the practice of their ow n developm ent and, consequently, stands in the 
way of the m uch lauded goal of grass-roots "em powerm ent." The experience in 
H onduras illustrates how  this new  form of paternalism  and its manifestations are 
largely responsible for the failure of developm ent projects to meet the needs of 
the rural poor.
The most perverse manifestations of this neo-paternalism  can be seen in  the 
focus ADOs place on project-based developm ent and technology transfer. 
Because meticulously designed projects help ADOs retain a firm control of all the 
aspects of planning and implementation, m ost ADOs assume the task of 
painstakingly working out project details instead of presenting general ideas that 
farmers can evaluate. Similarly, the process of technology transfer helps ADOs 
m aintain control of the physical resources and knowledge necessary for the u ti­
lization of the new  technologies. A desire for pow er could be a motive for this
 ̂ The term AD O s w ill be used in this paper to refer to NGOs, developm ent institutions,
governm ent agencies and other organizations that w ork in agricultural developm ent in poor  
countries.
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m odus operandi, but paternalism is probably m ore of a culprit because ADO 
personnel usually assume that beneficiaries^ are incapable of carrying out pro­
jects to a happy conclusion if left to themselves, and thus, deem  it necessary to 
retain control if their efforts are to succeed.
This study will attem pt to dem onstrate how  virtually all the activities of 
ADOs are shaped by this new  form of paternalism , from their objectives, to their 
methods, to their evaluations. The paper will explain why, w ithin this context, 
current practices of ADOs can achieve only very hm ited gains in furthering the 
cause of the rural poor as their formula for rural developm ent fails to address, ei­
ther directly or indirectly, the real causes of poverty and powerlessness.
Concrete suggestions will be m ade as to how  ADOs can redirect their efforts 
so that they will stop working the rural poor and start working with them  in a 
common search for developm ent that is autonomous, dignified and self-sustain­
ing. A major conclusion of this paper is that horizontal campesino-ADO cooper­
ation is a fundam ental and often underestim ated requisite for advancing the 
livelihood of the rural poor.
ADOs have failed to achieve their lofty goals of equity and sustainability for 
m any reasons, including the fact that m any ADOs have their ow n agendas and 
hidden goals that do  not necessarily coincide w ith those of the poor.
Nonetheless, many ADO personnel have a genuine interest in the fate of the 
poor, but perhaps continue to focus on paternalistic approaches to developm ent 
because they have not closely examined the m erit and validity of their basic as­
sum ptions and methods. This paper is w ritten  w ith these activists in m ind and 
with the hope that the poor farm ers they attem pt to help will truly be beneficia- 
ries of their efforts.
 ̂ The term s beneficiaries, farmers, small farmers, poor farmers, small land-holders, peasants, and 
campesinos w ill be used interchangeably in this paper for tw o reasons: to avoid excessive  
repetition of one term, and to avoid  associating a particular connotation, that could arise from  
historical or current usage, to any single term.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
D e s c r ip t iv e  O u t l in e
Chapter one presents a background of H onduran  agriculture w ithin the 
fram ew ork of its predom inantly agrarian economy. Then, it gives a brief de­
scription of the characteristics of current agricultural developm ent w ork in 
H onduras. Revealing indicators of the social and economic well being of the ru ­
ral population in Central America and, particularly, in H onduras are submitted 
to show that, despite large am ounts of foreign developm ent aid, the lot of the 
poor is today worse than ever. The chapter then describes the situation of small 
farmers in particular and concludes by suggesting that the worsening conditions 
of small farmers and the greater concentration of w ealth in the country is in fact, 
partially, a result of agricultural developm ent aid.
C hapter two describes the m ethods by which ADOs try to "prom ote" their 
technologies and ideologies. It also explains w hy these m ethods are detrim ental 
if not in the short, then in the long run  for campesinos.
Chapter three examines the image that developers have of their intended 
beneficiaries, in this case, campesinos. Developers typically look dow n on 
campesinos and underestim ate their knowledge and abilities. It also describes 
how  ADOs tend to see themselves as saviors of the poor rural masses and how  
this perception arises from a new ly evolved form of paternalism, or neo-pater- 
nalism. Because of this attitude, most ADOs have a limited view of local partici­
pation and see it only as one more com ponent or "input" by which participants 
contribute to the success of the projects they promote. At other times, participa­
tion is taken to be no more than equitable access to the benefits derived from 
participating in the ADOs' projects (Oakley 1991:172-173).
C hapter four reviews the m ain goals of ADOs and how  these arise from 
their basic assumptions. ADOs wish to increase the farmers' quality of Hfe and
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assum e they can best do so by increasing their productivity. Increased produc­
tivity then becomes a subgoai which, they further believe, can m ost effectively 
be achieved by introducing technological packages by means of projects. Of 
course, the technologies first have to be adopted  by the farmers, and as a result, 
farm er "adoption" becomes yet another subgoal of ADOs. The chapter argues 
that the assum ptions m ade by ADOs are debatable at best, and the subgoals de­
rived from them are a result of neo-patem alism ; particularly, the focus on tech­
nology transfer ADOs use to achieve their goals stems from a belief that their 
technical know-how can rescue poor farmers. Upon deciding that the technolo­
gies they control are exactly w hat campesinos need, ADOs become chiefly con­
cerned w ith changing the farm ers' behavior so that they will adopt their tech­
nologies. Promoting technologies adoption—a subgoal often difficult to 
achieve—by itself consumes a considerable part of the resources of ADOs. To 
complicate matters, even w hen adopted, new  technologies can, and often do, 
have negative consequences. The last part of this chapter presents the experi­
ence of ODEF as a case study of an ADO that has attem pted to implement two 
very different approaches to the problems of rural developm ent. On the one 
hand, ODEF through its m icro-enterprise developm ent program  espouses a true 
participatory and enabling developm ent process. On the other hand, ODEF's 
other program s (especially those in sustainable agriculture and appropriate tech­
nologies) assume a paternalistic, top-dow n approach. The results of both ap­
proaches are examined.
The final chapter describes how  and w hy the present paternalistic philoso­
phies of ADOs rob peasants of the opportunity to practice their own develop­
m ent and the attainm ent of personal growth. Because ADO projects act mainly 
as palhatives, they actually tend to sustain the status quo and keep the poor in 
their place. Fundam ental reasons for poverty, that present agricultural devel-
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
opm ent work fails to address, are discussed. Finally, suggestions are m ade as to 
how  ADOs can modify their goals and m ethodologies so that they can m ore 
significantly im prove the lot of the poor. A program  in H onduras that uses the 
participatory process approach to developm ent is examined. This example 
serves as a practical model for ADOs on how  they can be most effective in rural 
development. The participatory process approach to developm ent "relies on...an 
interactive style of problem  solving" in which ADO personnel negotiate "with 
potential beneficiaries to establish some common priorities" (Gow and Sant 
1985:124,126). Supporters of this approach basically contend that ADOs can 
better serve the poor by doing just that, acting as servers, working closely with 
grass-roots indigenous groups, and acting as providers of resources, and when 
called for, offering advice and guidance to these groups.
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Ch a p t e r  1: a g r i c u l t u r e  a n d  a g e u c u l t u r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  i n  H o n d u r a s
Background
Central America is the most rural region of Latin America. Whereas in the 
rest of Latin America the rural population is only 24 percent of the population, in 
Central America it is 54 percent (Annis 1992:174). Tied to this fact. Central 
American economies have a predom inantly agrarian character. Within this 
context, the economy of H onduras probably depends m ore on agriculture than 
that of any of its Central American neighbors. Agriculture accounts for 27 
percent of the Gross Domestic Product and agricultural products make up  58 
percent of all export revenues.^ The agricultural sector employs m ore than 50 
percent of the labor force (Barry 1991:338).
The agriculture practiced in H onduras can be classified into four major cate­
gories. First, there are the multinationals practicing highly mechanized, highly 
capitalized agriculture. The largest agrobusinesses in the country are United 
Brands, Castle & Cooke and RJ Reynolds (Del Monte). They export raw  and 
semi-processed products such as bananas, pineapples, palm oil, beef, and sugar. 
H onduras is among the leading producers of bananas in the world.2 In 1987, ba­
nanas accounted for almost half of H onduran  agricultural export earnings.
(Barry 1991:309) Second, there are the m edium  to large producers. These are 
m iddle and upper class H onduran farm ers who raise cattle, grow coffee or other 
export products, sometimes called "non-traditional" exports. These include 
citrus, cantaloupes, cacao, and watermelons. Included in this group are also the 
burgeoning shrim p and lobster producers on the H onduran  southern coast. 
Third, there's the landed peasantry. I ’hese are tninijiindistas or small landholders
1 The main agricultural exports in descen din g order are: bananas, coffee and shellfish.
2 H onduras is som etim es called the original "Banana Republic".
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who rarely own more than five hectares of land. They practice subsistence 
agriculture and grow  basic grains (e.g., beans, com, sorghum, and sometimes, 
rice); however, an increasing num ber are growing export products on a small 
scale. They are poor, receive very few services, but are not completely 
dispossessed. The rest of the rural inhabitants are the landless peasants. These 
are the poorest of the poor and make up  about half of the rural population 
(Barry 1991:309). They are often tenant farmers who work the land as 
sharecroppers, practice shifting agriculture, and work as field laborers in com­
mercial export farms (e.g., bananas, livestock, coffee and sugarcane). In order to 
survive, they also engage in non-agricultural activities such as the sale of wares 
and handicrafts (Maradiaga Diaz 1990:11-12).
Due to the param ount importance of agriculture in the H onduran economy 
and because the majority of the population still practices agriculture as its princi­
pal way of life, m uch work is currently taking place in H onduras in the area of 
agricultural development. The two main executing bodies are the governm ent 
and non-profit NGOs. The government obtains a large part of its budget to im­
plement agricultural development programs from international institutions such 
as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), and from other governments such as the European Economic 
Community (EEC), Japan, Canada, and the U.S. through organizations such as 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Inter- 
American Foundation (lAF).
The Honduran Government
The H onduran government does most of its extension work through two 
agencies, the Ministry of Natural Resources (Secretaria de Recursos Naturales,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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SRN) and  the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario, INA). INA 
works primarily w ith the reform sector, that is, the small percentage of campesinos 
(poor farmers) who have obtained land through the country 's deficient land re­
form program.^ INA has divided the reform sector into two subsectors: those 
w ho grow  commercial export crops and those who grow  basic grains. Export 
crop farm ers have been given the best "designated areas" and 55 percent of the 
cultivable land. They also receive most of INA's budget resources (i.e., 65 per­
cent versus only 8 percent for the basic grains subsector in 1981) and technical 
assistance even though they m ake up  only about 30 percent of aU reform  groups 
(Stringer 1989:372). It is not surprising, then, that export-oriented groups have 
been the m ost successful.
Non-Governmental Organizations
It has been estim ated that 86 percent of the NGOs currently working in 
H onduras perform  agricultural extension w ork either as a prim ary or secondary 
activity (M aradiaga Diaz 1990:34). According to a recent study, sixty-six NGOs 
have projects in agricultural extension, delivering services to approximately 
50,000 beneficiaries w ho represent about 15 percent of the farmers in the 
country. These NGOs hire a total of 564 employees to do the agricultural exten­
sion work, m ore than twice the num ber hired by the main agricultural extension 
governm ent agency, SRN. Also, the 50,000 farmers who receive services from 
the NGOs are tvrice as m any as those serviced by SRN. Most of these beneficia­
ries are small producers w ith their ow n plots, groups from the reform sector or 
low income w om en w ith families (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:1).
 ̂ Since it began in 1962, the "agrarian reform" as is know n in H onduras, has affected barely 8'V, 
of the nation's farmland and only 10% of the rural fam ilies.
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Of the NGOs working in agriculture, forty (sixty percent) are of H onduran 
origin, the rest are affiliated w ith international NGOs, mainly from the U.S.. This 
latter group includes the largest organizations: Association Save the Children, 
Christian Development Commission, Plan of H onduras, World Neighbors and 
W orld Vision. These NGOs get most of their support from their parent organi­
zations. M ost of the other H onduran organizations get some support from for­
eign, m ainly from the U.S., private foundations and individuals. To a lesser ex­
tent support is also received from the H onduran governm ent and international 
institutions. Almost half of the NGOs have religious affiliations (Kaimowitz, et 
al. 1992:6), and therefore, get m uch support from local and international church 
constituencies. The churches most involved in agricultural developm ent are the 
Catholic,^ the Anglican, and the Episcopalian
The diverse groups, organizations and institutions m entioned above are 
spending considerable am ounts of money in development, particularly agricul­
tural development, in H onduras. To illustrate, the Land Use and Productivity^ 
Enhancem ent Project (LUPE)—USAID's largest natural resource m anagem ent 
project in Central America—runs with a budget of $50 million (1988-1995) 
(Stonich 1992:396). ODEE's center for sustainable agriculture and environm ental 
education will run  w ith a budget of approximately $800,000 for its first three 
years of operation (ODEF and Katalysis 1993:1).
Failures o f Current Agricultural Development Work 
Between 1979 and 1991, Central America received approximately three 
billion dollars in developm ent assistance from the U.S. (Annis 1992:177 ). From
Catholic Relief Services, one of the NG O s w ith  w idest coverage, is the developm ent arm of the 
Church. The German Catholic Church supports an agricultural training center and other 
programs in western H onduras. The Catholic Church in southern H onduras supports an­
other agricultural training center through the San José Obrero Association.
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the developm ent assistance agencies of industrialized countries in general. 
Central America received an average of $1.26 billion per year in Official 
D evelopm ent Assistance (ODA)^ betw een 1982 and 1989. H onduras received an 
average of $243 million a year in CD A in this time period (Ham m ond 1992:236).
Even w ith this substantial flow of money pouring into the small Central 
American economies, poverty in the region is today more w idespread than it 
was in 1980.^ More than half (56 percent) of the general population and 70 per­
cent of the rural population is considered poor (Annis 1992:5).^ The situation in 
H onduras w here 70 percent of the general population is poor is even more 
distressing. 80 percent of the rural population is poor, 87 percent of which lives 
in extrem e poverty (Annis 1992:183). 90 percent of the rural labor force is 
affected by seasonal unem ploym ent; 65 percent of this labor force is under 
employed. 52 percent of rural H ondurans lack access to potable w ater and 58 
percent lack means for the safe disposal of waste products. (M aradiaga Di'az 
1990:87) Only 45 percent have access to health-care services (Barry 1991:319). 38 
percent of children younger than five exhibit some degree of m alnutrition 
(Stonich 1992:387). This state of affairs is reflected m H onduras' highly skewed 
income distribution: the richest 20 percent of the population receive 58 percent 
of the national income while the poorest 20 percent attem pt to survive on barely 
4 percent (Annis 1992:181).
Most of the developm ent money spent in the last fifteen years has gone into 
projects for natural resource m anagem ent and rural developm ent w ith little to 
show for it. Annis notes that.
5 O D A  is the net am ount of disbursed grants and concessional loans received by a country. 
Grants include gifts in m oney, goods, or services, for w hich no repayment is required. A 
concessional loan has a grant elem ent of 25 percent or m ore (Ham m ond 1992:236).
 ̂ A ccording to a report by the International Labor O rganization, poverty in Latin America in­
creased by 26% in the 1980s. Central A m erica's poverty increased even more than the Latin 
Am erican average (ILO 1992:31).
7 T hose unable to m eet a m inimal standard of nutrition.
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despi te...new policies and programs, and a substantial investment of 
public and private money, three inescapable realities remain:
• Poverty has generally gotten worse, not better
• The region's physical resources are being depleted at an ever ac­
celerating rate
• Current responses—though often positive—are neither reversing
poverty nor stemming the drain of physical assets (Annis 1992:3- 
4).
The Social and Economic Conditions o f Poor Farmers
Between 1974 and 1988, urban population in H onduras grew  at an annual 
rate slightly greater than 5 percent versus only 2.8 percent for the rural popula­
tion (Daugherty 1989:40). Considering that fecundity is about twice as great in 
the rural area, these figures point to the fact that H onduras is no exception to the 
phenom enon of large scale rural to urban m igration taking place in most poor 
countries. This m igration is a clear sign of an ever degrading quality of life in 
rural areas stemm ing from a lack of opportunities, a lack of access to suitable 
agricultural land and a lack of development, sustainable or otherwise.
The production of basic grains in H onduras, the type of agriculture most low 
income farmers practice, suffered greatly during the 1980s. The country w ent 
from being a net food exporter in the late 1970s to a net food im porter in the 
1980s. Presently, H onduras does not feed itself. In 1988, for instance, 35,000 
m etric tons of com, 6500 metric tons of beans, and 8000 metric tons of m ük 
products had  to be im ported into the country (M aradiaga Diaz 1990:82). A 
reason behind this phenom enon is a considerable increase in the production 
costs of basic grains during this time period. Between 1974 and 1987, costs 
jum ped from $40/H a  to $266/H a  for beans and from $37 /Ha to $225/Ha for 
com  (M aradiagaD iaz 1990:82). This increase can be attributed to a high inflation 
rate and to a decreasing land base that forces farm ers to exhaust the land
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dedicated to basic grains so that increasing am ounts of fertilizers are needed to 
sustain yields. The land base dedicated to basic grains has decreased in part be­
cause of population grow th but also because m ore land has been turned to 
growing export products such as beef, sugar and cotton. For instance, develop­
m ent program s supported by foreign aid (e.g., the W orld Bank) have encour­
aged the grow th of the cattle industry w hich now  takes up  about 30 percent of 
the total H onduran land surface, m uch of this being good agricultural land 
(Barry 1991:327). This point will be further developed later in the paper. Because 
the increase in costs of basic grain production stems from compensation of losses 
in several areas of the agricultural systems, it has not translated into higher 
yields (M aradiaga Dfaz 1990:82-83).
Yields of m ost basic grains in Central America declined in the 1980s. In 
H onduras, betw een 1981 and 1987, yields per hectare of the two m ain staple 
food crops, com  and beans, decreased by 18 and 30 percent respectively. By 
contrast, yields of three main export crops—bananas, coffee, and sugar—showed 
a m arked increase. Yields of bananas increased by about 18 percent and those of 
coffee by 35 percent (Annis 1992:188). This partly reflects the tendency of gov­
ernm ent extension agencies to support the export sector to the detrim ent of 
producers of basic grains, the deteriorating land base for food crops, and the fact 
that export producers are able to hire private technical assistance.
The situation of small farmers is difficult enough, but it has been exacerbated 
by the large quantities of grains, such as com  and wheat, that the U.S. sends to 
H onduras in the form of soft credits under the PL480 Title I Food Aid program .
In the 1980s, H onduras received an average of $17 million annually in food aid 
im ports. These im ports not only increase the national debt, but depress prices 
for small farmers trying to m arket their grains.
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AU the factors outlined above combined w ith a rapid  increase in population, 
have resulted in a m arked decrease in annual per capita production of staple 
grains. C om  w ent from 128 Kg in 1970 to 91 Kg in 1988, and beans from 17 Kg 
to 5 Kg in the same time period. It is im portant to note that staple grains supply 
about 57 percent of the calories and 49 percent of the proteins in the H onduran 
diet (Ardon Mafute 1983:116). Com  accounts for m ost caloric and protein intake 
in the rural area. A survey of campesinos in southem  H onduras found that 51 
percent of the household essentially ate only tortillas and beans (McCuUoch and 
FutreU 1988:187). This decrease in production, coupled w ith an increase in 
poverty, led to a reduction in per capita caloric and protein intake with the result 
that m alnutrition, w hich had declined in the 1960s and 1970s, worsened in the 
1980s (Barry 1991:319). According to the World Health Organization, 75 percent 
of H ondurans suffer from some degree of m alnutrition (Barry 1991:305).
The Role o f ADOs
ADOs, as wiU be discussed in this paper, have lacked either the ability, the 
wiUingness, or the insight to address the fundam ental factors that have resulted 
in the various predicam ents that plague small farmers and their agriculture. 
According to a joint report by governm ent agencies and the US AID,
the low  yields of [Honduran] agriculture clearly reflect the poor qual­
ity of extension services...the program s are distant from the needs of 
producers...[most] working m ethodologies d o n 't take into account the 
opinion of producers w hen making decisions,...[with the result that] 
m ost H onduran  [farmers] receive no technical assistance of any kind, 
and for those w ho do, it is not appropriate (Daugherty 1989:119-120).
Though they have failed to im prove the quality of their lives (much less, 
"em pow er" them), the m yriad developm ent projects in rural areas have touched 
the lives of m ost of the H onduran  poor in one way or another. No longer are
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they the naive, rem ote farmers who looked in hopeful am azem ent at the tech­
nologies brought in by outsiders. In a way, the experience of the last fifteen to 
tw enty years has m ade today s rural poor more suspicious and distrustful of 
outsiders. Annis makes an interesting graphic exposition of the characteristics of 
today 's "post-developm ent" dispossessed:
The social character of poverty in the 1990s is very different from that 
of previous generations...First, though as economically impoverished 
as ever, the rural poor of the 1990s are no longer necessarily isolated 
or "traditional." Today's rural poor are not generally self-contained 
subsistence farmers of a backwater population waiting for develop­
m ent to happen. In Choluteca [Honduras] for example...the hardw are 
of developm ent projects peppers the landscape: Peace Corps rabbit 
hutches, CARE latrines. World Neighbors terraces, EEC farm imple­
ments, USAID schools, and IDB health posts, and governm ent officials 
hurry in the acronym-initialed, four-wheel drive vehicles.
Rather, these rural poor are w hat is left over after development...The 
poverty they face is in m any ways more deeply ingrained and more 
intractable than the "traditional" village poverty of their parents' gen­
eration (Annis 1992:8-9).
Some authors argue that m uch international developm ent aid has actually 
helped worsen poverty and inequality by helping entrench some institutions that 
keep the masses oppressed (Alvarado 1987; Barry 1991; Stonich 1992).
Elvia Alvarado, leader of the Central Nacional de Trabajadores del Campo 
(CNTC), a peasant grass-roots organization, suggests not only that foreign de­
velopm ent projects have done little for her people, but that they are, in fact, par­
tially responsible for their situation: "the Peace Corps can send more and more 
people, the United Nations can have more and m ore projects, AID can be here 
for a century—and our problems would still exist...for us aU these institutions are 
just part of the system that keeps us poor" (1987:103). USAID, for example, has a 
great influence on the developm ent w ork practiced in H onduras. USAID is 
alm ost completely responsible for last decade's extraordinary grow th in the
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num ber of NGOs working in H onduras since "most of this increase was in U.S. 
private and church organizations funded by the U.S. government" (Barry 
1991:322). But USAID uses its influence to advance U.S. political and economic in­
terests by supporting conservative sectors of the H onduran society w ho favor 
the status quo while it d isregards those less powerful groups who struggle for 
change: "Most AID developm ent funds go to groups that focus on en­
trepreneurship^ export production, or paternalistic community development. 
Excluded from AIEXs funding program s are grass-roots peasant associations, 
m ihtant trade unions, progressive developm ent organizations, and human-rights 
groups" (Barry 1991:322). Does USAID, then, intend to achieve just developm ent 
when, as the few progressive, independent NGOs in the country beheve, this can 
only occur by directly supporting "self-organized poor people's organi­
zations?" (Barry 1991:322). Barry concludes that USAID
has not used its economic-aid package to help H onduras tackle its deep 
structural problems such as land tenure patterns and declining per 
capita grain production. N or has it insisted that the governm ent and 
ohgarchy develop strategies to m eet the basic health, educational, and 
income needs of the country 's impoverished majority. Instead AID 
has concentrated on implementing the macroeconomic and private- 
sector solutions that aggravate and accentuate the deep social and eco­
nomic divisions in H onduras (1991:331).
In this respect, USAID-funded traditional agricultural extension projects gener­
ally disregard the small farm er as they are aimed mainly at medium and large 
farmers (Derclaye 1987:12). The Inter American W omen's Commission 
m aintains that extension w ork from the H onduran  governm ent "tends to actu­
ally keep the peasant population unaw are and away from their main concerns." 
(CIM 1984:A-9)
The reasons for the failure of ADOs to meet their larger goal of raising the 
quality of life of the rural poor are many, including institutional, pohtical, and
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technical problems and deficiencies^ plus self-interest and outright corruption.
Yet one m ain reason—seldom acknowledged—is the focus on offering individual 
projects in tent on transferring technology. Instead of prom oting self-reliance by 
letting campesinos attem pt to solve their ow n problems, projects tend to make 
them m ore dependent by giving them only the role of implem entors and exclud­
ing them  from the process of designing and planning the program s from which 
they are supposed to benefit.
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Ch a p t e r  Z: W o r k i n g  m e t h o d s  o f a D O s
The Basic Four Step Method
The assum ptions, beliefs, predispositions and attitudes of ADOs have been 
synthesized in a basic methodology used almost universally in H onduras and 
most other poor countries. Starting from  a prem ise that technology transfer 
should be the basis for agricultural developm ent, ADOs have developed a basic 
four step working m ethod. H iese steps, extensively used by extension agencies 
in H onduras, are:
1) Gather inform ation from the communities (usually called "community
participation"). This includes a physical study of the area and a socio-eco­
nomic study of "target" groups in order to understand their needs and 
priorities.
2) Develop o r select pre-developed technologies
3) Design, p lan and im plem ent project-based program s to prom ote these
technologies and enhance the likelihood of their acceptance.
4) Follow-up and evaluation to determ ine how well the farmers are imple­
menting the organization's project(s).
Social/Technical Studies and Technology Selection
According to Vergara and MacDicken, the first steps before attem pting to 
"dissem inate" agroforestry systems are:
• Identify and understand the characteristics and basic needs of the in­
tended beneficiaries of technology diffusion efforts.
• Define and understand the nature of the agroecosystems within which 
these beneficiaries operate.
17
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This basic inform ation is indispensable in form ulating effective exten­
sion m ethods and technology delivery strategies, (underlining added) 
(Vergara and MacDicken 1990:355)
While this inform ation may be im portant for extension work, it should not be so 
for the purpose of "formulating...technology delivery strategies", bu t as a back­
ground know ledge of the people and the land. By using this information to as­
sess how  to convince campesinos to do  their bidding, ADOs are treating them as 
objects and not as subjects.
According to Bonilla Contreras, director of the National Program for 
Agricultural Research, the m ain areas of activity for an "adequate" system of 
technology generation and transfer are: "characterization and analysis, planning, 
experimentation, and technology transfer" (1983:112). "Characterization and 
analysis" refers to gathering inform ation on the agro-ecological and socio­
economic aspects of the region where extension work is going to be carried out. 
This mainly means studying existing agricultural systems, and identifying physi­
cal and  social limiting factors in the farm and its surroundings so that 
"appropriate" technologies can be developed or selected.
In H onduras, NGOs start working in an area by first visiting "the com muni­
ties to see if anyone is interested in participating [in their projects]" (Kaimowitz, 
et al. 1992:11). The NGO comes to the com munities w ith one or m ore pre-de- 
signed projects in some cases, in others, it just brings the technology and works 
out the details of the projects later. Then, "the NGO tries to get to know  the 
com m unity problem s through inform al surveys or meetings where com munity 
problem s and possible projects are discussed" ' (Kaimowitz, et al, 1992:11).
NGOs consider this first step "comm unity participation." They usually use the
 ̂ W orld V ision, for instance, sends extensionists for a couple of w eeks to a comm unity to find  
out about local problem s before develop ing its w orking plan.
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inform ation gathered at this point to decide which of their pre-packaged 
technologies to use and how  they can make them m ore acceptable to the 
com m unity.
INADES, a H onduran  private organization that specializes in environmental 
education and environm ental consulting, provides a good example of how this 
methodology is actually pu t into practice. U nder a one year contract (1992), 
INADES was to provide ODEF staff and beneficiaries w ith environmental educa­
tion, training and support in environm ental projects. INADES' "promotion" 
work follows the format:
1) Visit the communities and arrange a m eeting w ith community members.
2) At the meeting give a basic talk about environm ental issues and explain
concepts such as "ecosystem" and "food-web."
3) Ask the participants to list all their community problems.
4) Arrange for a second m eeting where a working plan is to be designed.
A ttendance to the first m eeting was usually good and people seemed enthu­
siastic except that m ost of the problem s they listed were not those INADES was 
supposed to work with. People would say things like "O ur children have d iar­
rhea", "We need better roads", "We don 't have enough land" or "O ur w ater is 
bad". M any of these problem s could be considered "environmental" yet, 
INADES w ould only support projects directly related to environmental issues 
such as reforestation and soil conservation. Such projects could help the com­
m unity in the longer term, but d id  not answ er w hat com munity members per­
ceived as their m ost im m ediate and pressing problems. Most people would be 
disillusioned after the first meeting (their expectations had been raised when 
they w ere asked about all their com m unity problems). Only a few would partic­
ipate in INADES' projects, and  fewer still, w ould carry them through.
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As m entioned earlier, I spent 1992 in H onduras helping ODEF w ith the 
planning of an agricultural training center for campesino families. This work 
followed the conventional pattern described above. The general plan of action
was;
1) Conduct a socioeconomic study and compile base-line data on the com­
munities w ith which the institute is to work. Conduct a study of the agri­
cultural practices and the physical characteristics in the region.
2) Meet extensively w ith potential clients to clarify their needs, interests and 
priorities.
4) Clarify the vision, mission, and concrete objectives for the institute.
5) Design the curriculum, services and programs. Refine teaching m ethodol­
ogy and select a num ber of technologies and agricultural practices to teach 
at the institute.
Even though we, the planners, were to do all the decisions on w hat the cen­
ter was going to be like, the project was, of course, supposed to have 
"community participation." All the community participation we had use for 
took place during steps one and two. We felt confident that, based on observa­
tions, surveys, interviews, etc., we, as project planners, could devise technologi­
cal solutions for the agricultural problems of the communities in the whole 
northern area of H onduras. This goal was undoubtedly presum ptuous and 
based on the questionable assum ption that a large centralized institution can be 
effective in addressing the problem s of diverse groups of small farmers in an ex­
tensive area.
Program Design and Planning
The program  design and planning step is illustrated by the Land Use and 
Productivity Enhancement Program (LUPE), USAID's ambitious $50 million nat­
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ural resource m anagem ent project being im plem ented in SRN in central and 
southern Honduras. The project has an eight year life span (1988-1995) (Stonich 
1992:396). Within this period it intends to benefit directly 50,000 small farmers 
and, indirectly, another 15,000 peasant families (SRN/USAID 1988:3). Its main 
objectives are:
—An increase in the basic grain production of 50,000 small farmers by an av­
erage of 30 percent. Sixty percent of these will be hillside farmers and 40 
percent wiU be small commercial producers. 12,500 of these will be house­
holds led by women.
—Im plem entation of so il/w a te r/ forest m anagem ent systems on 50,000 
hectares of hillsides.
—Crop diversification—to provide fruit and vegetables—practiced by 5000 
peasant families.
—A n increase of 5000 hom e and com munity vegetable gardens grown and 
m anaged by w om en in the participating communities.
—Commercial production—in excess of subsistence needs—of agricultural 
products by 5000 peasant families.
—The introduction of agroforestry applications that include 6 million multiple 
use trees plus 500,000 fruit trees through the developm ent of 500 new  
com m unity tree nurseries and additional small tree nurseries in the indi­
vidual farms (SRN/USAID 1988:4-5).
H ow  w ere these num bers arrived at? The SRN/USAID project description 
has no indication that "beneficiaries" were involved in any way in arriving at 
these figures. One w onders how m uch the num bers have to do w ith reality.
The project is even more complex,. These objectives are only for one of its com­
ponents, the Crop System Enhancem ent com ponent. The project has two more
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(equally detailed) components: Animal System Enhancement and Post-Harvest 
Interventions, plus a program  of Credit and Incentives.
This project exemplifies how program  planners devise neatly packaged pro­
jects that reflect their aspirations and not necessarily, the beneficiaries'. These 
types of projects are bound to encounter resistance from the campesinos. Take, 
for instance, the objective to create 5000 new  vegetable gardens to be managed 
by w om en in the communities. Are there enough women who care about veg­
etable gardens to fulfill these objectives? And, even if they are induced into 
growing and m anaging these gardens (perhaps through the use of food or m on­
etary incentives, also m entioned in the projecT s description document), w hat as­
surances exist that the gardens will be m aintained w hen the incentives cease? Of 
course, probably most of the project's officers feel satisfaction at doing some­
thing "good" for the poor of their country when, in reality, they are actually 
helping perpetuate their poverty.
Evaluation
Evaluation, the last step of the ADOs' working m ethod is usually very lim­
ited and tends to overlook beneficiary feedback. Besides, it generally fails to in­
corporate com prehensive evaluations of the projects' long term general goals 
and consequences. Cox notes that,
[Project] feedback is absent in conventional, over-engineered devel­
opm ent efforts...[and] evaluations are seldom designed to be more 
than reflections on w hether or not a project is being executed as 
planned, and as m easured by the highly structured and often quanti­
tative indicators of progress set forth in the original design (1992:63).
H onduran NGOs typically conduct periodical self-evaluations to discuss the 
progress of their work. However, these evaluations address only logistical con-
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cems, and, in the best cases, the accomplishment of quantitative goals such as the 
num ber of com m unal tree nurseries, or the num ber of hectares devoted to a 
particular agricultural practice. (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:15-16) Again, once ADOs 
have a project underw ay, no serious reflection on its overall goals, consequences, 
acceptance, or social sustainability of their projects is carried out.
The attitude behind the four-step m ethod is well illustrated by SRN's well 
structured "system of operations." Its basic steps are to:
—assess the needs of local communities and the condition of the natural 
resource base;
—form ulate technical assistance strategies and select appropriate inter­
ventions;
—plan a chronological sequence for technical assistance activities;
—scientifically m onitor the level of success and validity of techniques 
being implemented (underlining added) (Dulin 1987:459);
This "system of operations" reflects the tendency, common among ADOs, to 
think for their beneficiaries by "formulating strategies" and devising detailed 
long term  plans from which the locals will supposedly benefit. This approach 
tends to underm ine ADO w ork and the attainm ent of their stated goal of self 
sustained developm ent in the countryside. It is rooted in stereotypes and mis­
conceptions that outsiders usually have of campesinos that wül be examined in 
the next chapter.
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Ch a p t e r  3: C o m m o n  A t t it u d e s  o f  A D O s  t o w a r d  P o o r  Fa r m e r s
Stéréotypés and Misconceptions ADOs Generally Hold about Peasant Fanners 
In order to better understand the workings of ADOs, it is necessary to u n ­
derstand their views of campesinos. In general, one finds that developm ent 
planners see poor farmers as backward and ignorant. This belief is partly based 
on the fact that m ost campesinos have little formal education and use apparently 
crude agricultural practices. Their relatively low yields serve as proof of their 
backwardness to educated agricultural technicians who see a direct causal rela­
tionship beft\ een traditional agriculture and low yields. For this reason, outside 
"experts" rarely bother to leam  about traditional practices, their merits and con­
straints. They assume that "local information and knowledge are intrinsically in­
ferior and therefore to be ignored" (Gow and Sant 1985:125). Thus, they feel 
they have nothing to learn from campesinos.
A nother common perception in H onduras is that, if not for their ow n sake, 
campesinos should be helped out of their desperate situation in order to avoid 
social instability.^ Arriaga, as director of IN A, believes that small projects are 
needed to satisfy the im m ediate needs of peasants because, otherwise, they be­
come violent and that violence spreads and produces the "phenomenons" seen 
in the countries around H onduras (Arriaga Iraheta 1983:83). SRN's m otto says: 
"By producing more, w e will preserve peace {Produciendo mas, conservarejnos la 
paz)" (Derclaye 1987:17). This view alienates developm ent workers from 
campesinos because campesinos gain im portance not in their own right but as 
possible trouble makers. In other w ords, at the same time that developers w ant 
to help campesinos, they fear and distrust them.
1 This perception arises from the fact that in the 1980s Honduras was surrounded by countries 
w ith raging civil wars.
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ADOs also see small farmers not as a force to w ork with, but actually to 
w ork against. They need to break dow n the presum ed "resistance to change" 
that is an obstacle to agricultural improvem ent. Stephen McGaughey acting as 
chief of the Inter-American Development Bank states that, "since low-income 
farm ers are risk-averse...the developm ent of social forestry will usually face ini­
tial resistance in incorporating new adherents" (Gregersen and MacGaughey 
1987:12).
Campesinos are thought to be a hard  headed conservative group who can­
not come to realize w hat is good for them. Thus, a World Bank staff working 
paper states that one objective of com munication support is to "facilitate change 
in attitudes and behavior which stand in the way of people benefiting from the 
goods and services provided to them" (Perrett 1982:13).
Two F AO agents make true heroes ou t of extension workers because they 
have to deal w ith stubborn campesinos: "Special qualities m ark the successful 
extension agent. She or he normally possesses...the patience and perseverance 
of a teacher to enable him  or her to reach the evasive and reluctant farmers, and 
the dedication and persistence of a religious missionary..." (Vergara and 
MacDicken 1990:370). Is this hke colonizing Spaniards trying to "civilize" the 
"savage" Indians? The concept of fighting resistance, of pushing to get their 
way, that m any ADOs have, effectively obviates constructive dialog and a com­
m on search for solutions.
Middle-class H onduran  urbanites—the social group that many ADO agents 
and program  planners belong to—see campesinos as Indians (in fact, most are 
culturally Mestizos, not Indians) because they are generally darker and have 
m ore Indian stock than the overall population. Thus, people from the rural area 
are usually called "Indians." The noun "Indian" and the adjective "stupid" usu­
ally go together in the common phrase indio bruto. Thus, racism cannot be
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overlooked as a factor that helps institutionalize the view that peasants have be­
low average intelligence and lack the capacity to solve their ow n problems.
Comparisons between Poor and Affluent Farmers
The prejudice against poor farm ers becomes more obvious in the compar­
isons m ade between them  and wealthier farmers. Because of their greater eco­
nomic success, ADOs regard affluent farmers w ith more respect than small 
farmers even though their success is largely due to their greater access to re­
sources. To a point, ADOs even exem pt large farmers from having a need of the 
resource m anagem ent technologies they consider essential for small farmers. 
Vergara and MacDicken (1990:356) feel that even w hen large farmers can benefit 
from new  technological packages they "are m uch better informed, and can 
decide m uch more readily to adopt any land-use system...that best suits their 
goals."
In another com parison , the director of the National Program for 
Agricultural Research run  by SRN says that large farmers "have a good cultural 
level, economic sufficiency, and a driving competitive spirit. The Programs of 
[Technology] Transfer and Generation find no obstacles in the adoption of new 
technologies offered to them " (Bonilla Contreras 1983:103-104). By contrast, 
peasants do not adopt new  technologies not just because they lack money or 
other resources but because of their low "cultural level" and their lack of a 
"competitive spirit" (Bonilla Contreras 1983:104). Is the poverty of campesinos 
proof that they lack a desire to compete? H ow  necessary is this "competitive" 
spirit to im prove their agriculture?
Larger farmers are considered to have the ability to make wiser resource 
m anagem ent decisions than smaller ones even though this is often not the case. 
The erosion impact of grazing cattle on good agricultural land, for example, can
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hardly be considered good resource m anagem ent. W hat's more, they are given 
the prerogative, denied to campesinos, of m aking the decisions they consider 
best for themselves. This deference to affluent farm ers on the part of ADOs ba­
sically says "If you are rich you are free to exercise your best judgment; if you 
are poor you better do as we say because your poverty is evidence that you lack 
the sense to know better than the experts."
The above examples show  how  campesinos are stereotyped, lum ped to­
gether as a group w ith similar traits. Overlooking their heterogeneity and indi­
viduality makes it easier for developers to come up  w ith simple solutions for 
their complex problems. In addition to underestim ating the knowledge, abilities, 
and resources of campesinos, ADOs are inclined to see themselves as possessors 
of technological solutions to deliver to farmers, solutions that, they believe, pu t 
them in the position of saviors of the dispossessed. This technocratic neo-pater­
nalism stems from the view that ADOs have of their "target" groups or popula­
tions as needy yet inept people.
Neo-Pa terna li sm
Because of the opinion professional developers have of campesinos, it comes 
as no surprise that they see them as forsaken children in need of help and, re­
spectively, see themselves as their saviors. In this context, the knowledge and 
capacity of campesinos is usually underestim ated. When IN A evaluated the fact 
that millions had been spent in agrarian reform  program s and in huge projects 
that benefited only a few peasants, it decided to,
take a small project to the peasant because w ith his level of agricultural 
culture he's not capable of starting a small project of cantaloupes. H e's 
not capable of starting a project of com. He doesn 't know how much 
money to invest, w hat the costs and benefits are, w hat insecticides and 
fertilizers [he needs] (Arriaga Iraheta 1983:82).
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A lthough the campesinos might not have all the information and skills available 
to start a commercial project, they are, m ost likely, seasoned farmers who do not 
necessarily need to have the project taken to them. Instead, they need informa­
tion, training and other basic resources to assure the eventual success of their 
projects. Yet, INA feels that w ithout its paternalistic support, campesinos are 
bound to fail. Thus, it is not enough to provide resources to the campesino be­
cause "even then he could fail. We need to take to him a small project, already 
designed, and then, there is a real possibility of success" (underlining added) 
(Arriaga Iraheta 1983:84).
Bonilla as chief of the agricultural research program  of the SRN also believes that 
campesinos need ready-m ade solutions that only technocrats can provide.
Hence, the SRN needs to quickly generate technologies "so that they can conse­
quently be tried and adopted by the producers. O ur clientele really needs a spe­
cial treatment...Only then can we solve problems or present solutions to them 
[the farmers]" (underlining added) (1983:104). With this attitude, development 
planners and technocrats become the protagonists of developm ent whose 
"mission" is to save campesinos, to lift them out of their misery w ith im ported 
skills and new  technology. Campesinos are reduced to helpless objects waiting 
to be saved by urban technocrats. They are merely the instrum ents of 
developm ent. As long term  directors of w hat they consider "development", 
ADOs deprive campesinos of the possibility of self-reliance. International ADOs 
share this view. Stephen McGaughey, as chief of the Inter-American 
D evelopm ent Bank states that, as one of the first steps in a social forestry 
program ,
adequate research and local testing will have to be done by the project
coordinator to select the proper tree species...[further,] the eventual
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
29
success and w ide a c c e p ta n c e ^  by the rural population of social forestry 
will depend ultimately on the ability of...public and private institutions 
to design the technology, transfer the resources, and adm inister the 
program s continuously for long periods of time, (underlining added). 
(Gregersen and MacGaughey 1987:15-16)
Developers take the pretentious attitude of believing they have the ability to 
save the w orld (and its people) if only they were listened to. Yet, drawing from 
the experience of a series of agricultural developm ent projects in Mexico, Cemea 
observes that project planners, far from possessing the best working solutions,
lacked the requisite knowledge of local conditions to choose wisely 
among the m ultiple projects that could be undertaken. The local elites 
and various politicians exploited planners' lack of information and con­
tact w ith the grass-roots to capture public investments for projects that 
primarily benefited them, disregarding the acute needs of the poorest 
strata. W ithout proper knowledge of local needs and potentials, even 
well-intended planners could do no better than choose to make in­
vestments they themselves assum ed were needs (1992:14).
Hence, it would be m ore reasonable for ADOs to humbly accept that they do not 
have all the answers (no one does), and approach farmers with a willingness to 
share potentially useful ideas. This way ADOs could work together w ith farmers 
by putting at their disposal the resources available to them in a joint effort to find 
solutions to some of the farm ers' problems.
Varieties o f Paternalistn
In his highly acclaimed and widely read prim er for agricultural developm ent 
"Two Ears of Com " Roland Bunch distinguishes between two kinds of paternal­
ism, the "give away" paternalism  and the "doing things for people" paternalism 
(Bunch 1982:19-23). This second type of paternalism, he notes, is more subtle
-  AD O s usually equate "wide acceptance" w ith "success," regardless of production or econom ic  
welfare results
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than the first and, consequently, "m ore w idespread and less often recognized as 
being harm ful" (1982:22). By "doing things for people," Bunch means 
operational tasks such as "mak[ing] trips to town, do[ing] the accounting, 
....pay(ing] the bills, keep[ing] people working together, or troubleshoot[ing]" 
(1982:22). Thus, by denouncing these types of paternalism. Bunch is advocating 
the w isdom  of the old proverb: "Give a m an a fish and he will eat for one day, 
teach him how to fish and he will eat always." But doing things for people goes 
beyond a projecf s implementation. By attem pting to transfer technologies they 
have decided poor farmers need, by organizing farmers in favor of their 
projects, by designing and running developm ent projects, by attem pting to 
convince farmers that their way is best, ADOs are practicing an even more elu­
sive form of paternalism: the paternalism  of thinking for people.
To Bunch's list one should add this new  form of paternalism which entails the 
paternalism  of making im portant decisions for people, and the paternalism of 
believing "our" projects wiU solve "your" problems, in other words, the pater­
nalism of one group presum ing that it has the answers another group needs, a 
monopoly in truth. This type of patemaUsm is even more w idespread and less 
recognized as harmful than those identified by Bunch because of its implicit ac­
ceptance by the developm ent community. Yet, this patemaUsm, like its more 
obvious predecessors, removes the developm ent process from the hands of 
small farmers. This is where its danger Ues because if poor farmers are to stand 
on their own, they need to develop their character as fuU hum an beings. To the 
old proverb one should add: "give a m an the opportunity to develop his inde­
pendent thinking, to speak his voice, and the fisherman (along w ith his fellow 
fishermen) will be able to act w hen a factory upstream  starts polluting his fishing 
grounds."
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Because ADOs have refined paternalism  to a new, subtler form, this new 
kind of paternalism  will be referred to as "neo-patem alism " in this paper. One 
of the predom inant manifestations of neo-paternalism  is the belief that 
campesinos have a very limited ability to fully participate in the definition, design 
and m anagem ent of developm ent program s. This view leads to a narrow  inter­
pretation of w hat com munity participation is and self-fulfilling expectations of 
w hat it can achieve.
ADOs' View o f Local Participation 
Because ADOs wish to avoid the "paternalistic" label, they have enthusiasti­
cally embraced the concept of "community participation," but because they still 
rem ain paternalistic, they are not ready to give up  control. Thus, they have 
reached a compromise in which they understand local participation only as con­
sultation with the farmers plus their involvement in low-level decision making 
and project implementation. In this sense, local or community participation is 
considered a desirable—but not essential—element in project planning and im­
plementation. Therefore, it has virtually no significance outside the context of 
particular projects introduced by ADOs. A consultant m community participa­
tion for the World Bank defines it as the ability of beneficiaries to "influence the 
direction and execution" (underlining added) (Paul 1987:2) of projects and 
program s, bu t has nothing to say about the beneficiaries being able to judge the 
validity of the projects/program s in the first place. In fact, local participation 
usually m eans nothing m ore than com m unity members providing information 
(identifying problems and needs) so that the program  planners can make ad­
justm ents to their pre designed projects, or a t best, allow people to choose be­
tween tw o or more pre determ ined "alternatives." Many ADOs call partidpa-
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tion w hat "in practice [is actually] a form of decentralized decision making still 
dom inated by NGO staff and local elites, [in which] local elites often receive a 
disproportionate share of benefits" (Ham m ond 1992:223).
The view that community participation is an im portant but not indispensable 
element in agricultural developm ent projects has been expressed by influential 
international institutions such as the FAG and the World Bank (Vergara and 
MacDicken 1990; Yudelman 1979). Two FAG agents note that "ordinary 
farmers...as adopters of innovative production technology...are an im portant 
element of the extension system. W ithout them...the extension process cannot 
be carried out completely" (Vergara and MacDicken 1990:370). This is clearly an 
understatem ent since the very meaning of "extension" implies a "reaching out" 
so that farmers should be at least half of the equation.
Even though NGGs are generally believed to be more participatory than 
other ADGs, a recent study found that H onduran NGGs working in agriculture 
extension to poor farmers do not regularly include campesinos
diagnosing problems, designing plans, and evaluating results [and], it 
is uncom m on to find strong com munity participation. In spite of the 
fact that almost all NGGs talk about community participation, in 
actuality, verticalism is stiU dominant. Decisions are taken unilaterally 
by the program  technical planners. Many NGGs understand 
participation as the presence of beneficiaries in their [the NGGs'] 
activities, and not as the contribution of beneficiaries to planning and 
decision making (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:12).
ADGs that come w ith predesigned projects have their own agendas in mind. 
They justify spending of donors' funds and their very existence by minutely de­
signing impressive projects that leave little room  for flexibility. Complex p re­
designed and pre-packaged projects, by their very nature, tend to exclude bene­
ficiary input because overdesign places a straitjacket on their ability to adapt and 
evolve as the case may require. As a result, these projects do not systematically
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solicit significant involvement from beneficiaries but instead, allow "only highly 
selective feedback...to influence decisions on adapting...to changing circum­
stances" (Cox 1992:63, 65). When, com m unity involvement is scant the 
"beneficiaries" see the project as the organization's, not as their own. So, w hen­
ever problem s are encountered, the outside organization has the sole responsi­
bility to resolve them because, a lack of participation in the design and m anage­
m ent of a project results in a lack of comm itm ent to the project's success. 
Consequently, w hen the project runs into unexpected obstacles (almost always 
the case), it lacks the com m itm ent (experience, resources, ingenuity) of the bene­
ficiaries who, as a group, have probably a greater ability than project planners to 
resolve such situations. Projects that iriinirriize the role of local people run  high 
risks of failure because they do not tap into the resources, knowledge and abili­
ties of the farmers themselves. The extensive involvement of campesinos is 
param ount because it can "provide better inform ation about local needs, help 
adapt program s to local conditions, provide opportunities for better communi­
cation, help mobilize local resources, [and] im prove the odds that use and main­
tenance of facilities will be sustained..." (Ham m ond 1992:223).
Development program s that do not work closely with beneficiaries face an 
uncertain future because to achieve social sustainability they need to engage 
beneficiaries to the extent "that they will choose to remain involved [with the 
program ] over time." W ithout broad com m unity support, Cox warns that 
"program s m ust rely on unsustainably expensive subsidized incentives or, 
worse, on coercive or punitive m eans to force compliance vvdth unpopular m ea­
sures" (Cox 1992:61). Besides, the program s lack vital local knowledge of soils, 
rainfall patterns, pests and diseases, m arket preferences, etc.
Taking this into consideration, ADOs' understanding of community involve­
ment has evolved. Not long ago, the perspectives of poor farmers were hardly
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even considered. Nowadays, m any project planners are striving to take into ac­
count the farm ers' knowledge of local resources and conditions and their ex­
pressed needs while making efforts to involve them in "canying out the planned 
projects" (Cemea 1992:15). Thomas distinguishes three types of what ADOs 
understand as "participatory processes": "(1) genuine representative, (2) top- 
dow n sensitive...and (3) local-elite decision making" (Thomas 1982:15). 
Nowadays, m ost ADOs practice the "top-dow n sensitive" approach which is 
"based on sensitive consultation and interaction with those to be affected by the 
project" (Thomas 1982:15). However, even "sensitive consultation" is no 
substitute for true cooperation and pow er sharing between ADOs and farmers. 
As noted earlier, ADOs find it too easy to advocate community participation, 
carry out a few com m unity surveys, and then design the programs according to 
their original interpretations of w hat is best for the communities.
It is necessary, then, to go beyond the concept of community participation in 
"top-dow n sensitive" outside projects to one of self-development by the com­
munities. By not program m ing preconceived solutions, ADOs can avoid the 
"motivation" and "participation" problems, major concerns of project-leaders 
(Derclaye 1987:33), because the undertakings can then be the people's own 
occurring as part of "spontaneous developm ent" (Cemea 1992:2). Cernea notes 
that "farmers acting as economic agents...do not just 'participate' in devel­
opment: they simply ^  it. They carry out productive activities according to 
their ow n goals, plans, designs, and resources. They are the actors and m an­
agers of their ow n economic growth, survival, and change 'program s'" (1992:2). 
Yet, ADOs can still play an im portant role in this type of developm ent by acting 
as providers of any num ber of services and inputs the locals may need and by 
offering guidance in areas w ith which the farmers m ight have little knowledge 
or experience. Thus, ADOs could offer material inputs and services such as
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technical assistance and training, access to information, communication, 
education, or w hatever other resources happen to be available to the ADO.
The notion of participation is closely related to the process of technology 
transfer. Usually ADOs wish to encourage participation in order to increase the 
likelihood that participants wÜl adopt new  technologies. Because adoption is a 
principal aim of participation, "participation" is often conceived as only a project 
element to help achieve this purpose. As consultant to the World Bank, Perrett 
states that communication support—part of the World Bank's community partic­
ipation efforts—aims to "facilitate change am ong project populations" and to 
"help to cope w ith negative behavior or attitudes" (1982:8). Concerning the 
attitude towards change that intended beneficiaries may have, Perrett adds that 
"project populations—particularly the poor—frequently are not ready for major 
change in their lives, or for the rate at which such change has to take place" 
(1982:8). Ironically, far from affecting major change in their lives, ADO projects, 
more often than not, leave untouched the causes for the abject poverty in which 
rural populations Hve.
W hat has now become the conventional notion of community participation 
arises m ore from a concern over the "success" of particular projects than over 
the long term welfare of the participants. For example, the World Bank consid­
ers its communication support activities such as "information, education, m oti­
vation, [and] prom otion" are needed to change "opposition [to a project] to ac­
ceptance" and to "encourage certain groups of people to participate in a devel 
opm ent project so that project goals are achieved" (Perrett 1982:8-9). The Bank is 
not concerned w ith the question of why there could be opposition to a project in 
the first place. Instead, in a surprisingly candid statement, a World Bank report 
states that communication support is particularly useful w hen the aim of a 
project is to "change w hat people w ant and like" (Perrett 1982:12).
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As a result of a newly gained awareness of the im portant role of community 
m em bers and groups, "Comm unity Participation" has become a buzz phrase 
am ong ADOs. Yet, in most cases, their work still excludes beneficiaries from 
playing significant roles in developm ent program s. Even in the best of cases, 
com m unity participation is just that "participation" in projects designed, perhaps 
with the inpu t of com munity members, by outsiders. In their self-appointed role 
of leaders of the poor rural "masses" and because of their often scarce under­
standing of their "clients" ADOs have m ade highly debatable assumptions about 
w hat campesinos need and how  these needs can best be met, as described in the 
following chapter.
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ADO Goals and Assumptions
The prim ary stated goal of most ADOs is to improve the quality of Life of 
poor farmers. One of their basic assum ptions is that this can be achieved by in­
creasing agricultural productivity which will bring about an increase in the farm­
ers' income. I A nother basic assum ption is that a lack of appropriate technology 
is the m ain limiting factor poor farm ers face in their quest to increase their pro­
ductivity. From these assum ptions it follows that, in order to improve their 
quality of life, poor farmers m ust adopt new  technologies that, supposedly, will 
increase their agricultural production. Both of these fundam ental general as­
sum ptions are highly debatable. For one thing, they see poor farmers as a ho­
mogeneous group w ith the same needs and priorities when, in fact, they are in­
dividuals, each w ith a particular set of needs, desires, goals, and ideas as to how 
they w ould like to im prove their lives.
For instance, even though increased yields might be a primary goal among 
most farmers, it m ight not necessarily be their overriding priority. Some farm­
ers m ight be more interested in diversifying their production, protecting their 
natural resources, eliminating expensive and harmful inputs, increasing their 
leisure time, im proving their family's nutrition, or any one of various other goals 
(Gow and Sant 1985:126). Landless farmers, on the other hand, make most of 
their m eager income by cheaply selling their labor. Technologies that increase 
production are not particularly useful to them. They primarily need more 
sources of em ploym ent and policies that assure them  better wages and labor
1 An increase in incom e does not necessarily mean an im proved life. It can som etim es result in 
increased alcohol consum ption, gam bling, or overspending.
37
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
38
benefits. ADOs are know n to set w hat some call "nobody's targets" by aiming 
to achieve specific quantifiable objectives that are only products of their creative 
im agination (Derclaye 1987:21). All this aside, even when both the ADO and the 
farm er agree on the goal of increasing production, they m ight disagree on the 
m eans to achieve it. Further, an increase in production m ight not necessarily 
bring an increase in income if the farm er does not have access to markets, or his 
surplus production spoils because he does not have appropriate means for stor­
age or processing. Derclaye concludes that
Many project planners are being unrealistic in thinking they can start 
by assigning objectives to the...[poor farmers] different from those the 
farm ers w ould choose for themselves, although they may well be ones 
that the farmers w ould adopt at a later stage. Producing for the town 
or for export w ould never come top of the farmers' Hst (1987:21).
The assum ption that new  technology wül bring about an increase in produc­
tion is not always correct. Factors other than access to technology might limit 
productivity; for example lack of labor, time, or even w eather patterns so that 
new  technology m ight increase productivity only slightly, if at all. Agriculture is 
a very complex and unpredictable undertaking whose outputs are determ ined 
by a large num ber of factors of which technology is but one. Each area or geo­
graphical region has unique physical, social, and economic problems and oppor­
tunities.
This truism notwithstanding, ADOs have historically devised their work 
plans on the assum ption that technologically-induced productivity increases can 
by themselves take peasants out of poverty. Thus, up  to the 1970s, the main 
goal of ADOs was to increase food production through technological innova­
tions. At the time, these innovations consisted of high yielding grain varieties, 
expanded use of chemical inputs (i.e., fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides), and
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irrigation systems—the m ain elements of the actively prom oted "Green 
Revolution" of the 1960s and 70s. In the 1980s, land conservation and physical 
sustainabihty of agricultural systems became another im portant goal. Because of 
the failure of Green Revolution technology to address the basic problems of 
poor farm ers, there was a shift from the prom otion of agricultural inputs to that 
of agricultural techniques such as soil and water conservation practices and or­
ganic agriculture techniques. In H onduras, for instance, although some NGOs 
em phasize the use of agricultural inputs such as im proved seeds either donated 
or financed through credit, most em phasize training in new  agricultural practices 
(Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:2).
Either in the form of agricultural inputs or new  agricultural techniques, tech­
nology transfer remains the main thrust of ADOs. Most ADOs believe that tech­
nologies generated through scientific research can benefit large num bers of the 
rural poor (Vergara and MacDicken 1990), overlooking the fact that, historically, 
scientifically devised agricultural innovations have done just the opposite, 
increased the opportunities for more affluent farmers while drawing away 
resources from the poor. Besides, no single technological innovation or set of 
innovations has m uch chance of im proving the lot of "large numbers" of poor 
rural farmers, considering their diverse needs and priorities.
Still, Bonilla Contreras, as chief of the agricultural research program  of the 
SRN believes that the m ain objectives of an extension system should be 
"technology generation,... technological evaluation, and more effective transfer 
of technologies through a dynam ic extension and evaluation that furthers the 
impact of the technological system" (1983:112). In this context, the basic working 
m ethodology of ADOs has been to develop an expertise in certain technological 
areas, or to develop certain technologies and then to attem pt to convince 
farm ers to accept them. Some NGOs w ork to prom ote a variet}' of technologies
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encom passed in w hat is called integrated sustainable agriculture, bu t within this, 
they specialize in one or m ore fields. In H onduras, for instance, the Christian 
D evelopm ent Commission prom otes goats. Save the Children works in organic 
agriculture, small animal husbandry (mainly rabbits and fish), CARE specializes 
in agroforestry, and World Neighbors does m uch work w ith basic grains and 
vegetables.
Specialization is not necessarily bad, after all, the generation of new  technol­
ogy often comes from ADOs specialized in particular areas. But, it tends to drive 
ADO agents into trying to "prom ote" ̂  their area of specialization into adoption 
by farmers. They have invested so m uch time and effort into developing their 
particular technological expertise that their first priority becomes to introduce 
their technology at practically any cost. A report by FOPRIDEH, an umbrella 
organization for over half of the H onduran  NGOs, states that, "to get a peasant 
to adopt practices requires a direct prom otion effort from NGOs" (Kaimowitz, et 
al. 1992:16). Often, this "effort" entails a sales pitch in which overselling of 
technology becomes a common phenom enon.
Agricultural developm ent organizations feel that by offering the best and 
"latest" in agricultural innovations, it wdll be easier to convince the farm er to use 
it. Hence, they m ust have "something to offer that the farmer does not already 
have...it is critical for ...institutions to have new, im proved, and readily imple- 
m entable technologies to offer" (Vergara and MacDicken 1990:363). It is no 
accident that this paragraph sounds like a commercial. Most ADOs are in the 
business of selling their products (i.e., technological packages) to suspicious 
campesinos.^ On this point, Perrett, as consultant to the World Bank considers 
that one com mon objective of agricultural projects is to "influence w hat people
2 The w ord "promote" is used extensively by ADO s, generally, as a euphem ism  for "push."
3 This can also be seen in terms like "target clientele" often found in the literature w hen  
referring to potential farmer "beneficiaries."
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feel, believe or do" (1982:29) but concludes that "selling" projects is "obviously 
m ore difficult than selling commercial products, and requires adaptation of the 
concepts and  techniques that have proved so successful in the business world" 
(Perrett 1982:7).
Of course, someone has to pay for these packages, not the farmers because 
they are too poor (though sometimes they are required to contribute part of the 
cost). Instead, the developm ent costs of these packages are transferred to:
a) International developm ent institutions which, in turn, get their money 
from governm ents that, in turn, get their money from regular taxpayers. 
So taxpayers, mostly in the over-developed countries (ODCs), pick up  the 
tab that keeps ADOs afloat,^
b) NGOs who get most of their money from private groups, foundations, 
individuals, and international institutions. Again, the general populace of 
ODCs keeps bread on the table of developm ent workers and fuel in the 
tanks of their 4WD vehicles.
In order to prom ote their valuable technologies, NGOs in H onduras use "the 
Project [as] the global planning tool [which is also]...used to get outside financ­
ing" (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:1). By having projects that prom ote specific tech­
nologies and try to achieve specific quantifiable goals, NGOs hope to (and often 
do) attract outside financing. ADOs have assum ed that the lack of technology is 
one of the main limitations campesinos face and, consequently, have designed 
agricultural developm ent projects as the m ain vehicles of teclmology transfer. 
But, they have often encountered, perhaps unexpectedly, a major obstacle: the 
non-acceptance of their projects by intended "beneficiaries."
4 International financial institutions also get their m oney from many poor countries in the form  
of interest paym ents.
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Technology transfer and the issue o f "adoption"
A  central long standing concern of agricultural developm ent planners has 
been to get poor rural farmers to accept (adopt) their technological packages. 
M uch time and energy has been spent on academic studies and field trials to at­
tem pt to understand w hy adoption is such an elusive goal (Feder, Just and 
Zilberman 1982; Flansen and Erbaugh 1987). Many professional developers are 
baffled by the fact that farmers do not readily adopt "marvelous" technologies 
designed by highly educated technocrats using the latest scientific research.
Vergara and MacDicken, representing the F AO observe, somewhat dispirit­
edly, that "for reasons that are not weU understood, the adoption and application 
of new  or im proved agroforestry systems are not as w idespread as policy plan­
ners and rural developm ent strategists w ould wish" (1990:354). Yet they fail to 
question the validity of the concept of technology transfer itself. Instead, they 
see the problem  as a lack of "vigorous efforts" on the part of extensionists and 
conclude that "better strategies need to be formula ted... to enhance farmers' ac­
ceptance and adoption of appropriate agroforestry technology as widely and as 
rapidly as possible." (1990:355)
Speaking for the World Bank, Yudelman acknowledges, in a carefully 
w orded understatem ent, that technology "acceptance" is actually related to the 
attainm ent of the World Bank's tw in goals of "increase in output and incomes." 
But, he also has to adm it how  little the Bank understands the poor farmer's 
thinking w ho dares to question technology that is supposedly so potentially 
good for him: "The rate of acceptance [of new  technology]...has a bearing on the 
rate of increase in ou tpu t and incomes...this aspect of rural development is the 
crucial one. It is also the aspect about which the least seems to be known" 
(Yudelman 1979:18).
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M any reasons make poor farmers reluctant to accept or adopt outside tech- 
nological innovations, probably as m any as there are farmers themselves. In this 
sense, the overconcem  of developm ent planners seems to be badly placed in an 
attem pt to lum p all rural farmers together w hen that is simply not possible. A 
beneficial shift in focus would draw  project planners away from trying to de­
velop technologies for farmers to encouraging them  to develop, refine and adapt 
technologies (native or foreign) based on their needs and preferences. In this 
case, "acceptance" becomes a non-issue because the technologies would be the 
farmers' own, custom designed by them to fit their needs and desires, and prob­
ably as diverse as the farmers themselves.
The following examples from H onduras illustrate why adoption of foreign 
technologies, which for m any ADOs has become an end in itself, is such a com­
plex, difficult and often useless pursuit. The examples help dem onstrate why it is 
almost impossible to prescribe pre designed solutions to farm ers' problems. 
Some examples also show how, even w hen adoption takes place, it does not nec­
essarily have positive results.
Reasons for non-acceptance o f new technologies:
The new  technologies are too costly in terms of money, labor, or require much 
specialized knowledge a n d /o r  experience
In the com munity of Mojiman, Yoro (North Central Honduras), INA re­
cently introduced small commercial waterm elon projects. Several peasants said 
they were having troubles growing waterm elons commercially because they 
"did  not know  how  to grow watermelons. It’s people from Copan [the w estern 
part of the country] w ho know all about waterm elons" (Various Campesinos 
1992). They also said that they had difficulties buying all the inputs that INA
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recom mended.^ INA will often finance the acquisition of these chemicals but this 
usually results in the campesino s acquiring a large debt. If the harvest is any- 
thing less than expected or if a calamity hits (droughts, floods, pests), not un­
common in H onduras, the campesino is left w ith a large debt and nothing to 
show for it. The campesinos would, most likely, not have chosen this project had 
they had the choice.
In this case, growing watermelons was imposed on farmers by INA in its ef­
fort to prom ote a new  cash crop in the area. But the campesinos felt this was not 
the right crop for them because of their lack of familiarity with it and the large 
capital investm ent it entailed. On the other hand, farmers w ith experience in 
growing vegetables are often eager to get involved in commercial vegetable 
projects and are willing to "risk" relatively large capital investments because 
they rely on their skills to almost insure success.^ Hence, in places of vegetable 
growing tradition, ADO-sponsored commercial vegetable projects have gener­
ally been successful (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:3).
The new  technologies are flawed or oversold—fail to deliver
A group of women in the com munity of Mojiman grow com  and vegetables 
on collective land. They asked INA for technical and credit assistance on grow­
ing onions and other vegetables for commercial purposes. INA answered by 
proposing a project of its ow n that, it believed, the wom en would profit from. It 
involved setting up  and caring for a tree nursery where they would grow mainly 
fruit and  ornam ental trees for sale. After a few m onths of operation, the nursery 
looked good, superficially. It had a good, fairly expensive wooden fence, good 
roof protection where needed, good stands for seedlings, a large supply of black
5 INA usually recom m ends large applications o f chemical inputs which tend to be fairly 
expensive.
h Contrast this with the "risk-averse campesino" stereotype.
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plastic seedling bags, and a num ber of other details that gave the impression of 
a well financed project. Yet, there w ere very few seedlings growing, and m any 
of those growing looked sick and uncared for. O ne w om an said unapologeti- 
cally that they never really w anted that project, but INA told them they were 
going to m ake a large profit, that it w as easy, and that they would provide the 
funding to get it going. Once the project started, however, the dem and for trees 
was not as high as expected and the w ork was m ore dem anding than antici­
pated. Since m ost of the w om en were not interested in the project to begin with, 
they always had excuses not to show up  to plant seedlings, w ater the trees, or do 
other routine m aintenance chores. (Various Campesinos 1992) The nursery 
project that INA had depicted so optimistically became yet another outside- 
p lanned project gone sour.
In other cases, agricultural projects proposed by outsiders often fail to de­
liver as prom ised not because of social, cultural, or institutional constraints, but 
because of inherent flaws in the technologies themselves. Concerning agro­
forestry—often lauded as a panacea for rural agricultural problems—Gregersen 
and M cCaughey point out that although it can increase "the land productivity in 
m any areas...it is not the answer to every problem and suffers from being over­
sold by its proponents in some instances" (1987:11).
Accordingly, one finds that forestation (in the form of agroforestry, planta­
tions, or others) does not necessarily provide aU the benefits that popular w is­
dom  ascribes to it. For instance, Ham ilton and Pearce (1987) assert that very lit­
tle evidence supports the claim that large scale forestation results in increased 
rainfall in a given area. In an  interesting exposition, they argue that other claims 
concerning benefits of forestation such as prevention of sedim entation in 
streams, lakes and reservoirs, prevention of floods, and increased water avail­
ability in bodies of w ater are simply not backed up  by scientific and experimental
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evidence. In some cases, forests play only minimal roles in addressing these 
problems. In other cases, they can even cause effects opposite to those expected 
such as the lowering of stream flows and w ater tables because of the w ater re­
quirem ents of the trees themselves. Even erosion control, long lauded as one of 
the principal benefits of tree planting, is debated, the argum ent being that only 
w hen you have a well developed understory can you provide true erosion pro­
tection. This is not true for most plantations and agroforestry systems. Some of 
the scant systematic observations done in the tropics surprisingly show that for­
est plantations (with tree litter burned or removed) and taungya agroforestry 
cultivations result in higher average rates of erosion than shifting cultivation it­
self! H am ilton and Pearce conclude that "tree planting alone has not been shown 
to increase local rainfall, to prevent floods, to increase the flow of streams and 
springs, or to raise well levels" (1987:53).
Miscellaneous, hardly predictable circumstances w ork against adoption of new
technologies
Goat Raising
El Tablon is a well integrated and organized small community of about 200 
people. About tu n  years ago, the Christian Development Commission (CDC) 
w anted to introduce goat raising into this community because goat raising is one 
CDC's technical expertises and because goats tend to do well in dry  areas w ith 
poor soils w hich is the case of El Tablon. Lacking previous experience w ith 
goats, the com m unity started a goat raising project w ith the help of CDC. Now 
that CDC has left, goat reproduction is out of control and the community has so 
many, they don 't know  w hat to do w ith them. Some people use goat milk to 
feed their babies—who could probably benefit m ore from their m others' milk. 
But, older children and adults d o n 't drink the milk or eat the meat. They don 't
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like the taste of the milk and d o n 't know  how  to prepare the meat, and besides, 
they don 't w ant to kill the goats because it saddens them  to hear them m oan in 
an almost hum an fashion w hen being killed. Since the goats w ander about 
loose, not even their excrement is used as fertilizer, and their grazing adds to the 
already serious land erosion problem s the com m unity faces. Even though CDC 
prom oted the m ulti-use of goats, they are now seen m ore as a nuisance than a 
resource.
On the other hand, the dissem ination of goats in southern H onduras has 
been m uch more successful because that area has a goat raising tradition.
(Carcfa H enriquez 1992) So, by providing goats in southern Honduras, NGOs 
such as CDC are providing a service to people w ho already know and desire it, 
whereas in northern  H onduras, the NGO is only trying to prom ote or "push" its 
ideas.
O ther possible reasons why adoption of a pro jects technology m ight not 
necessarily benefit poor farmers include:
—the new  technologies cover non-priority needs or its objectives do not co­
incide wdth the farmers'.
—farm ers agree w ith the objectives of outside projects bu t not wdth the 
means.
—the m ain limiting factor is not lack of technology.
—poor results or losses result from lack of com m itm ent to the project.
Also, externally conceived projects often create dependency, stunt creativity, 
take farm ers away from more im portant concerns, a n d /o r  fail to prom ote long 
term  im provem ent
The above examples depict the contrasting results ADOs obtain w hen trying 
to im pose their designs and when, on the other hand, they let beneficiaries make 
their ow n decisions. To further illustrate this point and to show how even within
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
48
one organization these two diametrically opposed approaches will yield equally 
diametrically opposed results, the experience of a local H onduran NGO will now  
be considered.
Case Study: ODEF
In the last few years, ODEF has w orked in two areas of rural development: 
small business developm ent and integrated rural development. The latter in­
cludes w ork in sustainable agriculture, nutrition and appropriate technologies. 
ODEF's w ork in small business developm ent has been considered successful 
while that in the other areas has m et w ith repeated failures. Yet, in both cases 
ODEF has worked w ith the same communities and w ith the same personnel.
The difference in results can be explained by the different working philosophy 
that ODEF has used to address the needs of the beneficiaries in each case.
In the area of business developm ent ODEF provides resources and other as­
sistance that the beneficiaries use as they see fit to im prove the businesses they 
have chosen to run. ODEF limits its role to provide financial support services 
(credit, business training and technical assistance) to low income small rural busi­
nesswomen. This endeavor has been quite successful in the sense that loan re­
paym ent rates have been high (99.8%), the w om en have expanded their busi­
nesses, increased their profits and spent on family needs such as health and edu­
cation. In contrast to its w ork in small business developm ent, ODEF has, w ith 
little success, im plem ented a top-dow n technology transfer approach in the areas 
of sustainable agriculture nutrition and appropriate technologies. Thus, ODEF 
provides an  interesting case study of how  an ADO can have remarkably differ­
ent results in its outreach developm ent activities by applying different philoso­
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phies concerning the degree of control it chooses to exercise over the beneficia­
ries. Some specific examples follow.
Biodigestors
ODEF has tried to prom ote biodigestors along wdth pig raising projects 
am ong rural women. A few years ago, it financed the construction of small 
biodigestors so that w om en could use the excrement from their pigs to produce 
natural gas for cooking. At first w hen offered the hardw are and the financing, 
the w om en were enthusiastic about producing their ow n energy. But, a few 
m onths later, the biodigestors lay in disuse. ODEF's endeavor failed because 
wom en could not stand the smell of the pig excrement they had to collect and 
shovel into the biodigestor on a daily basis. They found it easier (and more 
agreeable) to w ash the pigsties w ith a hose or a bucket of water. The small 
biodigestors were gradually abandoned. (Aguilar Escoto 1992) Did the women 
fully understand w hat was involved before they decided to participate in the 
biodigestor program? H ow  m uch d id they actually participate in the planning of 
this program ?
Vegetable G ardens
Establishm ent of hom e vegetable gardens is the second biggest area of agri­
cultural extension w ork in H onduras (next to soil conservation). The m ain stated 
objective of AtX3s prom oting hom e gardens is to improve family nutrition. 
Hom e gardens are usually prom oted by handing out seeds and other inputs, 
along w ith informal training and follow-up visits. This methodology tends to 
create rehance on the NGO to carry out the project. Thus, when the NGO dim in­
ishes its level of support, or leaves, gardens are often abandoned (Kaimowitz, 
et al. 1992:17).
In 1990, ODEF decided it would be a good idea to prom ote home vegetable 
gardens among their beneficiaries. The prom otion work included giving talks.
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training and seeds to forty beneficiaries who agreed to participate in the project. 
A year later, only two or three gardens survived. Though adequate and timely 
follow-up w as deficient in this project, the main reason for its failure was that the 
beneficiaries were never really interested in the idea. They accepted the project 
in the first place because ODEF m ade it easy by helping them set up  their gar­
dens and giving them training and seeds. But once the gardens were established 
and ODEF left the participants on their own, they soon ran into problems (as 
w ould be expected since gardening was a new  experience to most of them) and 
quickly gave up. Those w ho had kept u p  the gardens probably believed in them 
from  the very beginning or even before ODEF proposed them. Those few gar­
dens that had  been kept w ere generally very well cared for. Effort and ingenuity 
had  been p u t into them. One, for instance, had an  intricate w ooden fence for 
which the w ood had to be hauled from a distance; another had a live fence m ade 
from pineapple plants that effectively kept chickens and pigs out.
Those w ho abandoned their gardens offered m any explanations ranging 
from having too m any rocks or shade in their plots, to diseases, lack of seeds, 
and  family problems.^ It's easy for anyone to be stopped by an obstacle w hen 
s /h e  does not really care about a project. On the other hand, w hen people really 
believe in a project they will not need extension workers to make them do it well 
because they will care for it and have the initiative to ask for help when they 
need it.
ODEF's original goal was to increase the nutritional value of the campesinos' 
diet. A lthough m ost campesinos would agree w ith this goal, they would not 
necessarily agree w ith the m eans to achieve it. Surveys have found that 
cam pesinos believe the best way to im prove their diets is to eat m ore animal
A beneficiary had a peculiar difficulty to resolve. Here's his account: "When my tom atoes 
w ere very big, my m om  hit them  w ith a m achete {me los macheteo) because she had a 
problem  w ith m e and she got so  m ad that she took it out on the plants."
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products such as eggs, milk, and m eat (McCulloch and Futrell 1988:192). 
Considering that their diet is so deficient in high quality protein, calcium and 
vitam ins found in animal products, this is not such a bad assessment.*
Solar Cookers
Since 1990, ODEF has been prom oting the use of Solar Box Cookers, a simple 
technology—basically a cardboard box w ith a glass cover and a reflector lid 
w rapped w ith alum inum  paper. They trap  the sun’s energy to cook virtually 
any type of food, and can be used m ost of the year in the hot tropics. WTiat 
could be better? Yet, after two years of prom otion, for various reasons, very 
few w om en w ith whom  ODEF w orks have adopted them. For one thing, the 
cookers take a long time to cook, not necessarily a problem if they could be left 
unattended. But, in northern  H onduras rains often come quickly, heavily and 
unexpectedly and a cardboard cooker caught m the rain is ruined. This w ould be 
a quite substantial loss because, contrary to w hat is advertised, the cookers are 
neither easy to m ake nor inexpensive. As they are currently prom oted in 
Honduras, under the auspices of Solar Box Cookers International (SBCI), they 
require fairly expensive m aterials that are not normally accessible in the rural 
area such as a glass plate, alum inum  foil, and silicone sealant (to glue and seal the 
glass to the box). Thus, they are beyond the m eans of the target population: 
poor cam pesino women.
ODEF m akes these cookers in the city and sells them to beneficiaries for ap­
proxim ately $30 each just to cover costs. For about the same price, they can buy 
a small one burner electric stove, generally preferred because it is faster, more 
reliable, m ore durable, and better know n (i.e., "easier to operate"). Another less 
expensive option is also available. For about half the price of a solar cooker rural
* It is difficult enough to convince m any North Am ericans of the value of eating "greens and 
vegetables" even though they are supp osed ly  w ell aware of it.
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w om en can have their fogon  ̂redesigned to be twice as efficient. The most popu­
lar energy efficient design for fogones is the 'Torena stove." The idea is to re­
build the fogon so that it will let escape as little heat as possible. This is achieved 
by closing up  the stove as m uch as possible, using special heat ducts to conduct 
the heat to the burners, and by adding a smoke stack. Rural wom en accept this 
alternative m ore readily because it does no t greatly depart from w hat they are 
currently using, it is relatively inexpensive, and eliminates the problems of ex­
cessive heat and smoke in the kitchen, the tw o m ain reasons why wom en are 
dissatisfied w ith traditional fogones in H onduras. A nother advantage of re­
designed fogones is that peasant w om en can have them custom m ade to suit 
their needs and preferences. Some communities have local artisans w ho know  
how  to design these. ODEF helps finance the redesign of fogones w hen the 
wom en request it bu t does not actively prom ote them, for reasons explained 
shortly, as m uch as it does the solar cookers.
A nother reason w hy solar cookers have not found w ide acceptance is that 
firewood producing trees and shrubs grow  and reproduce fairly quickly in the 
area.i^ So, although firewood is not in am ple abundance, its relatively adequate 
supply makes its substitution not a priority am ong rural women. It should also 
be noted that m any w om en m ight prefer to keep their traditional fogones to 
solar cookers or even redesigned fogones because they have fashioned their 
cooking styles by feeling the heat and observing the flames in the fogones, 
som ething they cannot do w ith the other alternatives^  ̂ (Recinos C. 1991).
9 A  fogon is the traditional, highly inefficient, open burning clay hearth used for cooking in 
rural H onduras.
f 9 The madriado (Clyricidia sepium), for instance, is a w idely  used fast grow ing native species 
that produces good fuel w ood  with a high caloric content and has the ability to coppice. It is 
often used as stakes for fencing. Fuelw ood can be harvested in a short time as stakes grow  
into you n g  trees w ith m any branches a few  m onths after planting.
11 Som e w om en say that food cooked in traditional fogones "just tastes better."
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Besides, they m ight have more im portant concerns than im proving their fo­
gones.
Even though m ost extensionists at ODEF realize that these solar cookers are 
not accepted by, nor appropriate to m ost beneficiaries, they continue to reluc­
tantly prom ote them  because it is one of ODEF's program s. ODEF continues to 
prom ote them  because it receives a grant from SBCI to continue this work 
(Escoto M eraz 1992). Also, the project looks good in the eyes of current and 
potential donors w ho m ight w ant to fund an organization working in the area of 
environm ental protection. In short, the project is good public relations, and pays 
for itself. If not for those two factors, it w ould have probably been scrapped 
long ago.
The solar box cookers example dem onstrates three problems concerning 
top-dow n technology transfer and the issue of adoption. First, this technology 
was too costly. Second, alternative, m ore appropriate, and less expensive tech­
nologies were available. Third, the purpose of this technology (to reduce fire­
w ood consumption) was not as im portant to the locals as it probably was to the 
technology proponents—N orth  American environmentalists. By trying to pro­
m ote an  unw anted technology, developers are wasting both their and the 
campesinos' time.
While these tw^o examples dem onstrate ODEF's failures in one area of its 
work, the other area, small business developm ent, is considered highly success­
ful. Take for instance one of the m ain program s of ODEF, the Village Banks and 
Training Program. This program  provides small loans to poor rural wom en 
while allowing them  to make their ow n decisions. A brief description of the 
program  follows.
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Village Banks and Training
First, ODEF identifies villages w ith w om en w ho run  small enterprises (e.g., 
m aking cheese, baking bread, growing and selling vegetables, making handi­
crafts). Typically, a village will ask to be inform ed about the possibility of partic­
ipating in the program. ODEF then sends a representative to explain how the 
program  works: ODEF gives one large loan to a group of women. These 
women, about tw enty in the average, m ake up  a "village bank." The bank as a 
group decides which com munity m em bers could best use a small loan in a suc­
cessful venture.
The w om en come together and share their ideas about how  they wish to ex­
pand a n d /o r  improve their activities w ith  the available loan funds (about $100 
per person). W ith the help of ODEF, these ideas are formalized into short busi­
ness plans. All the w om en are interested in the viability of all the plans because 
they are responsible as a group to repay the entire loan, not just their portion. 
They help each other and build community. Prior to this experience m ost of 
them have never been involved in any organized com munity activity.
When the plans are acceptable to all the participants, a credit committee cho­
sen by m em bers of the bank gives final approval to the plans. Then, an ODEF 
representative will train them  in aspects of business developm ent, in the use of 
credit, and  in the m ethods of operating the bank. After the loans are distributed, 
ODEF is available to offer consulting for the new  businesses. Women borrow ers 
are elected by the overall group to be officers and m anagers of the bank and re­
ceive additional training from ODEF. Thus, this all-volunteer bank is effectively 
ru n  by the peasant w om en themselves. Upon repaym ent of a loan at the end of 
a loan cycle, the funds become available to be re-loaned to the same borrow ers 
to carry on their small enterprises. In the existing village banks the wom en are
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investing wisely, making paym ents on schedule and m aintaining organized bank 
records.
In this program  the village participants make the m ain decisions because 
they are creating the business plans and ideas for w hich the loans are to be em ­
ployed. This is the m ain reason for their success. The program  leaves the major 
decisions (what to sell, how  much, where, how to use the money, etc.) in the 
hands of the wom en w hile ODEF acts only as a resource that they can use to ob­
tain funds and assistance in technical matters.. As stated by Katalysis (a North 
American support organization for ODEF), "The approach is based on the con­
viction that people will take an active responsibility for making a project succeed 
only w hen they 'buy into ' that project, i.e., w hen they help formulate its goals, 
participate in its design and managem ent, and have an economic stake in its risks 
and rew ards." The wom en are the protagonists of a project sponsored, but not 
owTied, by ODEF. The Village Banks and Training program  helps wom en orga­
nize and w ork together, effectively putting the pow er back into their hands.
The contrast between ODEF's Village Banking program  approach and that of 
most other ADO program s is striking. It should be noted that, before em bark­
ing into top-dow n technology transfer program s, ODEF never had to preoccupy 
itself w ith the problem of adoption. Now, it has to dedicate considerable re­
sources to it. Thus, one main advantage of the approach used in the Village 
Banking program  is that resources can be used where they are needed the most 
instead of being w asted in the attem pt to induce farmers to "accept" ODEF's 
projects. Besides, in its Village Banking program , ODEF does not squander its 
capabilities in developing unneeded resources such as technical expertise, a spe­
cialized staff and a complex adm inistrative structure needed to design and run  
elaborate projects.
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A nother im portant strength of the Village Banking program 's approach is 
that it instills a sense of com munity because the wom en are working together 
and, in this way, creating social structures that can address other community 
problem s such as w ater projects, schools, roads, a community center, etc. With 
the confidence and organization gained from helping each other, they are in a 
position to ask for help from other types of funders or from the governm ent to 
solve a variety of com m unity problems
The project-based m ethod used by most ADOs, on the other hand, has basi­
cally two major flaws. First, it focuses on the transfer of technology which, as 
previously described, is often not accepted by campesinos, and even when ac­
cepted, does not necessarily bring long lasting benefits to the communities. 
Second, this m ethod concentrates in achieving individual project success stories^ ̂  
instead of building the capacity of beneficiaries to take upon themselves the en­
tire process of project design and implem entation so as to enhance their capacity 
to confront pow erful forces in their struggle for their interests. In short, ADOs 
concentrate on developing physical and technical resources instead of developing 
hum an resources. At the same time, the present approach does little to address 
fundam ental issues at the root of the ever deteriorating conditions of the rural 
poor.
1 2 x h e  reasons for this are varied but trying to impress donors and feeling a sense of satisfaction  
over having achieved som ethin^ tangible in a short neriod stand out as tw o of the main 
ones.
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P o o r
ADO Support: Who gets it?
ADOs and the Landless
ADOs in H onduras mostly support landed peasants w ho own small to 
m edium  farms (Kaimowitz, et al. 1992:1; Stonich 1992:397). The World Bank, for 
instance, concentrates on the landed poor because of its inability to develop 
"conventional" projects for the landless (Yudelman 1985:23). As noted earlier, 
the landless, who are in general the poorest of the poor, make up  more than half 
of the rural population (Barry 1991:309); for this reason, their needs cannot be 
overlooked. Landless peasants, also make up  the core of m ost grass roots 
peasant organizations (Daugherty 1989:63). This group relies heavily on off- 
farm em ploym ent for its survival. Stonich (1992:396) rem arks that, more than 
technological fixes to increase agricultural productivity, the landless need 
economic alternatives that enhance opportunities for the acquisition of off-farm 
income. Of course, they also need to gain greater access to productive land.
ADOs and Indigenous Grass-Roots Groups
Many ADOs (particularly NGOs) do  support grass roots groups, yet many 
others prefer to organize their ow n groups even w hen organized groups al­
ready exist in the communities. For instance, A lvarado (1987:103) complains that 
the Peace Corps refuses to w ork w ith grass root groups because they have "too 
m any problem s." She adds that if outside groups "really w ant to have most 
impact, they 'd  be working w ith the organized groups of campesinos...[but, 
instead,] they d o n 't bother working w ith the structures w e're struggling so hard 
to set up" (103). Many ADOs prefer to organize groups w ho will support their
57
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
58
projects by, for example, fostering "the diffusion of their technical support, 
[which is usually] limited to activities decided" by the ADOs themselves 
(Derclaye 1987:19).
Instead, ADOs should help local groups in their efforts to achieve "greater 
political and economic leverage" (Stonich 1992:396). Because of their greater 
access to resources, the support of AEXDs can enhance the ability of local groups 
to "exercise influence over local adm inistrators and assert claims on gov- 
emment[,] adap t project activities to local conditions[,j and manage the natural 
resource base rationally through education and training" (Stonich 1992:396). It is 
not enough to involve local individuals in the planning of developm ent 
program s. Grass-roots organizations also need to be included and strengthened 
because "stable forms of peasant self-organization" are more Likely to build 
participation in the long run, and thus, be m ore effective in mobilizing peasant 
efforts tow ards attaining sustainability in the long run  (Cem ea 1992:39-40).
Fundamental Factors o f Poverty and Powerlessness 
Generally Overlooked by ADOs
The worsening economic and social conditions for the majority of 
H ondurans arise from the fact that the underlying reasons for poverty and u n ­
derdevelopm ent rem ain virtually intact despite years of massive "development" 
aid. M ost ADOs fail to address the fundam ental causes of poverty and their oc­
casional involvem ent does not always favor the poor.
l and Tenure Patterns. Land Quality, and Land Security
As noted earlier, the agrarian reform  program  has had an insignificant effect 
on the distribution of land in H onduras. Like most Latin American countries.
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H onduras suffers from a highly skewed land tenure pattern. Sixty-four percent 
of the farms possess less than 5 hectares and cover merely 9.1 percent of the 
farm  land while 1.7 percent of the farms have m ore than 100 hectares and cover 
44 percent of the farm  land (Daugherty 1989:115). The so called, agrarian reform 
has served m ore as a social buffer to quiet dow n the m ost "troublesome" 
cam pesino groups. Real reform  rem ains a distant goal.
The Little land that the agricultural reform program  has distributed, for in­
stance, has been mostly m arginal governm ent land that no one else wanted. 
Besides, the agrarian reform has provided very few services to its beneficiaries.
In this context, by 1989, only 45 percent (Daugherty 1989:64) of the land given to 
peasants through the agrarian reform  program  had been pu t to productive use 
mainly because of a lack of infrastructure, credit, technical assistance, and the bad 
quality of the land itself. M any reform beneficiaries simply abandoned or sold 
their land to look for other means of livelihood. In some areas the desertion rate 
is as high as 44 percent (Daugherty 1989:68).
A skewed land tenure pattern is not necessarily detrim ental if the population 
has access to means of livelihood not dependent on the land and if the unem ­
ploym ent rate is relatively low. But, as noted earlier, H onduras has a highly 
agrarian economy and most of its population depends on agriculture while the 
rural unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent rates are extremely high. With that 
in m ind, however, probably m ore oppressive than the skewed land tenure pat­
tern itself is the fact that campesinos have the most marginal land for agriculture. 
Thus, not only do large landlords have the most land, they have the best land. 
Finally, even this could be (if ever so remotely) justified if this quality land was 
p u t to good use, bu t a 1984 study found that only 32 percent of arable land was 
being used for agriculture. (CIM 1984:70) Most of the good agricultural land is 
either idle or used to graze a few heads of cattle.
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M ore than half of H onduran campesinos also face the problem of lacking 
docum ents to verify their ownership of land. In m ost instances, they occupy 
public lands as squatters (Stringer 1989:363). Thus, they can be easily evicted, 
and often are, w hen more powerful landowners become interested in their land.
Education
In 1988, only 27 percent of H onduran children who enrolled in the first grade 
finished their elementary education (M aradiaga'Diaz 1990:32). Fifty-four percent 
of children 14 and older had  never been enrolled in school (M aradiaga’Diaz 
1990:55). These estimates are for the general population; but in the rural area the 
educational situation is m uch worse. Eighty-four percent of all children who 
drop out of school and 64 percent of those w ho fail to pass their grades are from 
rural areas. Many rural children repeat grades over and over again untÜ they 
are finally expelled from the system.
The drop in the iUiteracy rate was insignificant between 1973 and 1989 in 
H onduras, falling only from about 42 percent to about 40 percent (Annis 
1992:184). Most of the illiteracy is stiU in the rural area where the rate runs as 
high as 84 percent. Education in H onduras is not a right but a privilege "because 
of the lack of schools, the poor quality of public education, and the prohibitive 
cost of educational materials" (Barry 1991:316).
Campesinos also have little access to training on administrative, organiza­
tional, com munity planning, communication, and related skills that could help 
them  in their efforts to find solutions to their ow n problems.
Roads and Transportation
The lack of roads, bridges, and transportation systems greatly hinders the 
ability of campesinos to m arket their products and to acquire agricultural inputs.
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Paved highways and other well kept roads serve primarily the urban areas and 
those that produce goods for export in a commercial basis. On the other hand. 
Lempira, Intibucâ, and Gracias a Dios, three of the poorest defartamentos^ have 
no paved roads at all. Most rural areas in general are difficult to access. Small 
rural communities can be reached only by vehicles w ith four wheel drive, and of­
ten only by foot or horseback. In these areas, public transportation is usually 
nonexistent, and in the best cases, highly irregular. During the rainy season, 
w hen rivers rise, m any communities w hose access route crosses waterways, be­
come effectively cut off.
In a country smaller than the state of Pennsylvania, it takes two days to get 
from San Pedro Sula (the second largest city in H onduras) to the small rural 
tow n of Candelaria (a straight line distance of about 110 miles) using public 
transportation and quite a bit of walking. From Candelaria, which can only be 
reached by 4\VD vehicles, it takes another half day to reach campesino settle­
m ents in an area w hich can only be reached by foot or horseback. When 
campesinos from these communities need to go to Tegucigalpa (the capital city), 
it is easier and  faster for them  to go through El Salvador,^ which has better 
roads, even though they have to cover a distance almost twice as long.
A lvarado explains one instance of how  the lack of roads directly hurts the 
campesinos:
The guys w ith the fat wallets, the middlemen, come into the village 
and buy the campesinos' crops for next to nothing. But the 
campesinos need the money and have no choice. Who else can they 
sell to? H ow  can they get their crops to market? There are no roads 
to their villages, no buses that stop there. The only transportation is 
their mules and their ow n backs (1987:20).
1 H onduras is d iv id ed  into eighteen departam entos. The departam entos in the western and far 
eastern part of the country are the poorest and largely lack basic infrastructure.
-  Candelaria is in southw estern Honduras, near the Salvadoran border.
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Credit
Traditional peasant farm ers do not benefit from marketing, transportation 
and credit services. Since they cannot afford to store their grains at harvest time 
w hen prices are depressed, and since they cannot get their product directly to the 
m arkets, they often have to sell to interm ediaries at whatever low prices they 
can get. They use the money for basic necessities such as clothing and medicines. 
It is often the case that some time later they need to buy grains since they sold 
most of their production to satisfy m ore urgent needs. This time they buy their 
grains at m uch higher prices since it is the off-season and they are contributing to 
the profits of intermediaries. If they d o n 't have enough money, as it usually 
happens, they have to borrow  from local loan sharks at outrageous interest rates 
(sometimes in the hundreds) (Rochac 1983:152).
In another common situation, usurers own small stores to provide basic ne­
cessities to peasants including food, medicines, and tools. The peasants buy these 
products on credit and, at harvest time, have to turn in part (or sometimes all) of 
their production at prices dictated by the usurer. Again, they end up paying out­
rageous interests for the credit received (Rochac 1983:152). According to Elvia 
Alvarado (1987:19), "the campesinos are always selling cheap and buying dear. 
That's w hy they never get ahead."
As a sign of just how  im portant credit is to campesinos, a 1981 survey 
(Stringer 1989:375-376) of 271 reform sector campesinos found that over a one 
year period, 182 (67 percent) had turned to informal credit and borrowed cash 
from  either m oneylenders or friends in the form of in-kind advances or forward 
sales in order to meet personal, medical or agricultural needs.
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Being poor, campesinos have no access to credit from commercial banks. 
Even governm ent developm ent agencies fail to provide them  w ith credit and in­
stead, support the m ore pow erful farm ers of the export sector. Only 30 percent 
of campesinos in the reform  sector, w ith  m ore access to governm ent credit than 
any other peasant sector, get credit (Valeriano 1983:95). W hatever credit 
campesinos get generally comes in the paternalistic form of loans w ith unrealisti- 
cally low interest rates—a form of handouts provided by AIX)s as aids to trans­
fer particular technologies. With this practice, ADOs actually underm ine rural 
developm ent because they concentrate on providing cheap credit instead of at­
tem pting to build the beneficiaries' loan repaym ent capacity. This is an im por­
tant reason for the high default rate am ong poor farmers.
Even after they receive loans, the odds are heavily stacked against poor 
farmers because they m ight be planting im poverished land, lack proper agricul­
tural infrastructure, access to information, or to proper markets. Loans are gen­
erally aimed at the im plem entation of a specific technological package and do not 
cover all the other factors that work against poor farmer agriculture. 
Furtherm ore, campesinos regularly get loans larger than they have the ability to 
pay back only because the credit is cheap. Upon defaulting, their credit rating is 
ruined and they have difficulty getting additional loans. But, what is more im­
portant, campesino communities are left w ith no self-sustained financial institu­
tions that can be a source of healthy, rehabie credit for a long time to come.
Their abilities to save and to manage credit have been not enhanced but de­
graded. By concentrating on handing out loans instead of trying to build the 
strength of rural financial markets w ith policies such as mobilizing savings and 
im proving the financial viabihty of borrowers, ADOs actually weaken the capac­
ity of rural people to establish and benefit from financial institutions directly 
aim ed at them  (Blair 1984:185).
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It could be argued that cheap credits are not m eant to be like regular credits, 
that instead, they are a kind of bonus, a stim ulus to help the neediest farmers get 
on their feet. Yet, cheap credit cannot even be viewed as charity because most of 
it does not even reach the poor. Because of the high dem and for soft credits, 
public credit agencies in charge of handing them  out screen applicants and award 
them to those who present the least risk w ith the result that wealthier farmers 
get m ost of the loans and the largest am ounts (Blair 1984:187).^ For instance, in 
1984, BANADESA, the governm ent agricultural bank, gave 79 percent of its 
loans to cattle ranchers. Only 15 percent w ent to agriculture. In 1986, cattle 
ranchers received 58 percent of the governm ent's agricultural budget resources 
(Daugherty 1989:67).
Com m unication & Inform ation
Poor campesinos often lack critical inform ation that could guide them  in 
making im portant decisions such as w hat and w hen to plant, where to sell, what 
price to set, etc. Some of the im portant inform ation that the campesino usually 
lacks is:
—Regular w eather and harvesting forecasts.
—Inform ation on m arket conditions.
—M arket analysis and feasibility studies.
—Periodic and trustw orthy inform ation on the prices of their products 
including domestic and foreign price trends.
—O ther inform ation to make proper buying-selling decisions. (Montes 
1983:126-127)
According to Ardon, the campesino "tills, plants, and harvests w ithout ever 
know ing the price of his product" (Montes 1983:125). Statistical information, for 
instance, is kept by governm ent agencies, but rarely offered to those who need
3 Favoritism  and political clout also plays a major role in this process.
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it. (CIM 1984) Lastly, isolated farmers rarely com municate w ith other farmers 
from different parts of the country w ho may face similar problems and 
challenges.
Lack of Control over the Means of Production
Most of those campesinos w ho can produce a surplus are merely producers 
and suppliers of raw  products. While they may produce coffee, sugar cane, veg­
etables, fruits or other marketable products, they usually lack the ability to store, 
process, and m arket them. They sell their unprocessed products at low prices to 
those w ho process and commercialize them  and, consequently, keep most of the 
profits. As Santos Valeriano, a peasant w ith ANACH, the largest H onduran 
peasant organization pu t it:
We w ant not only land, credit, and technical assistance, we w ant to es­
tablish the necessary enterprises to process the raw  materials we pro­
duce. Otherwise, we'll always be enslaved to those with money. For 
instance, the sugar mills set the price [for our product]...they control 
everything. What are we then? Just producers? Perhaps, the m an 
w ho used to ow n the land we work today has become an associate of 
the sugar mill and all thaPs changed for him  is that he no longer needs 
to look for laborers. The [raw] product is delivered to him and he 
keeps all the profits...[That is why] we are trying to obtain all the 
means of production...so that we can control everything for our bene­
fit because, [as it is now ,] w hat we produce w ith our labor is not 
ours...we produce raw  materials to be delivered. (Valeriano 1983:96- 
97)
Macroeconomic Policies
Macroeconomic policies tend to favor the urban area at the expense of the 
rural area because of the greater economic clout and more vocal and "closer to 
home" dem ands of the urban population.^ For instance, inflation has decreased 
the purchasing pow er of rural inhabitants m ore than that of urbanites because
Large farmers, especially cattle ranchers, are an exception to this rule. Because ot their 
econom ic and political pow er (m any large landlords hold or have held high offices in the 
army a n d /o r  the governm ent), they have som e of the m ost influential lobbying associations 
in the country.
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prices of nonagricialtural products have increased faster than agricultural p rod­
ucts—some of which have even faced a decline (Stonich 1992:387). Government 
policies keep prices of agricultural products artificially low to benefit urban 
dwellers.
Privileges Are W orth M ore Than Rights
A n unfortunate legacy of Latin Am erica's colonial past is the prevalence of 
classism in Latin American societies where the privileges of a few override the 
rights of the many. Privilege stems from the concentration of political and eco­
nomic pow er and is fiercely protected by the ruling elites. ADOs, particularly in­
ternational institutions, contribute to this situation by choosing to channel most 
of their funds through central governments. In Honduras, the central govern­
m ent is an extension of the elites that w ork to maintain their privileges, and con­
sequently, the status quo. To illustrate, most low interest agricultural credits 
from international institutions, m eant to help small farmers, invariably end up in 
the hands of big farm ers w ith governm ent connections and the ability to bribe 
and to exert political pressure. Blair submits that "politics is the main reason for 
the persistence of subsidized credit. The large borrowers who gain most from 
cheap credit want to protect that benefit, and at the same time politicians and bu­
reaucrats w ant the pow er and the fruits of corruption that these program s put 
into their hands" (1984:184). ADOs generally allow national governments to 
assume the responsibility of m aintaining and operating the infrastructure they 
fund instead of placing it on the hands of "local governments and grass roots 
organizations that benefit from these services" (Lele and Jain 1992:580). As could 
be expected, this misplacement of responsibility generally results in inadequate 
and inefficient m anagem ent of the infrastructure.
The com bination of these and other factors (other areas where campesinos 
have little or no access are: markets, storage, threshing services, low cost agricul-
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
67
tural inputs, agricultural infrastructure, price control policies, and legal counsel­
ing) reduce the campesinos to powerlessness and pu t them at the mercy of cir­
cum stances beyond their control condem ning them to perpetual poverty.
Campesinos and the Export Sector
Some authors contend that campesinos can im prove their income in the long 
run  only by shifting from  growing basic grains to growing other, more rem u­
nerative, crops such as export crops (Tucker 1992; Wingert 1983). The argum ent 
is well founded considering that export crops constitute a full 66 percent of the 
aggregate value of H onduran agricultural products while basic grain crops 
constitute only 15 percent (Noe Pino and Ferdomo 1990:90). This difference is 
due, undoubtedly, to the m uch higher value of export crops. Others believe that 
food self-sufficiency is essential for any country, particularly poor agrarian 
countries, and the cultivation of basic grains plays a major role in achieving this 
goal.5 A ttem pting to resolve this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, but it 
w ould be useful to assume for a m om ent that campesinos can indeed benefit 
from a shift to export agriculture.
In this case, campesinos are iU equipped to even begin to compete with 
larger farmers. Export products are often fragile and require special handling 
and expedient transportation. They may require richer land, consume more w a­
ter, and be m ore susceptible to pests and diseases than traditional staple crops so 
that additional fertilizers, irrigation, and pest control measures might be needed. 
Further, well m aintained access roads, reliable transportation, access to markets 
and access to storage and processing facilities are invariably needed to be suc­
cessful export producers. As stated earlier, campesinos lack most, if not all, of
5 Yet, som e countries have adopted neither v iew  and have, instead, looked to industrialize by 
processing their agricultural exports and d evelop ing im port-substituting industries. (Lete and 
lain 1992:585-586)
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these basic resources. This puts them at a clear disadvantage. Thus, the benefits 
of the export market, which enjoys m any incentives from the current govern­
m ent, are beyond their reach.
Partly due to these incentives, the export sector has experienced growth in 
H onduras but because of the factors outlined above, the more this sector grows, 
the greater the concentration of the production and benefits is in the hands of 
larger producers and m ultinational agribusinesses w ho enjoy better access to re­
sources while small farm ers never make it into or are forced out of the business 
(Stonich 1992:386). For example, the expansion of the export sector in Southern 
H onduras including beef, cotton and sugar has resulted in more acute land 
concentration by rem oving "peasants from the land and...land from peasant 
access" (Boyer 1986:15). Unfortunately, ADOs have played an im portant role in 
this process.
By supporting land and capital intensive export production such as beef and 
shrim p production, USAID and the World Bank have helped displace small farm ­
ers (Stonich 1992). The W orld Bank has been a major supporter of the expansion 
of cattle raising in the area. Between 1960 and 1983 more than half (57 percent) 
of all the World Bank loans for rural developm ent in Central America supported 
beef production for export (Stonich 1992:389). H onduran large landlords have 
taken advantage of the im petus provided by cattle programs. To avoid 
expropriation under the H onduran land reform program , they have fenced and 
stocked w ith cattle previously idle land to claim it is being used productively 
(Stonich 1992:389). W ith the encouragem ent of ADOs such as the World Bank, 
the governm ent looks benignly upon these tactics and accepts them as valid 
under the agrarian reform  law. The expansion of cattle ranching in the 1970s 
intensified deforestation, the expulsion of small farm ers from their lands and, 
consequently, land concentration. In a similar fashion, since the early 1980s, the
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rapid expansion of shrim p farms in Southern Honduras,^ in w hat has come to be 
know n as the "shrim p boom" supported by USAID (Stonich 1992:392), has led to 
the deforestation of thousands of hectares of m angrove forests, the displacement 
of local peasants and artisan fishermen, and the increased concentration of land 
(Stonich 1992:393).
The above exposition dem onstrates that lack of technology, though some­
times an im portant factor affecting the agricultural systems of the poor, is only 
one elem ent of a complex picture. A combination of underlying factors keep 
campesinos in poverty by depriving them  of opportunities to prosper. Yet, 
ADOs continue to concentrate on technology transfer to im prove the agriculture 
and, ostensibly, the quality of Hfe of poor peasants. A dded to that is the practice 
of concentrating on projects that treat campesinos only as mindless implemen­
tors w ith  the net result that ADOs fail to address the larger issues that often neu­
tralize their efforts, and fail to provide campesinos w ith the tools they need to 
m ake their voice heard  in the general society.
ADOs seem to believe that social and political factors are outside their juris­
diction and thus, choose to focus on "non-risky" or "neutral" work such as tech­
nology transfer. Thereby, they indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, con­
tribute to m aintaining the status quo by introducing a few superficial changes 
while everything else stays the same. However, recent efforts in H onduras are 
attem pting to im plem ent a new  philosophy by which the ADO relinquishes 
some of its pow er and plays a supporting rather than a leading role in the devel­
opm ent act. The case of the Margoas Program  wiU be considered next.
6 Betw een 1980 and 1987 shrim p and shellfish products w ent from seventh to third am ong the 
principal agricultural exports experiencing an increase of more than 100 percent in their 
export value (Stonich 1992:388).
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The Margoas Program:
A Model o f the Potential Role o f ADOs in Poor Farmer Development 
A n innovative program  that could serve as a model for campesino-ADO co­
operation is being im plem ented in southw estern Honduras. The Swiss-spon­
sored M argoas program  (named after its two regions of operation: Marcala and 
Goascoran) is based on two fundam ental principles. First, developm ent should 
attem pt to increase the farm ers' "feeling of responsibUity," so that the 
"developm ent of things (health, roads, production) [is] merely a lever and a 
means for the developm ent of people." In addition, farm er's organizations are 
to be considered partners in developm ent and not merely "im plem enters or 
beneficiaries of operations belonging to the program m e" (Derclaye 1987:22). For 
this reason, the program  establishes a contractual relationship w ith the farmers. 
This contract originates by establishing how  the farmers' priority dem ands can 
be m et w ith the resources available to the program  (Derclaye 1987:12). The 
program  respects indigenous organizations as equal partners in development. It 
views indigenous organizations not as contact points to help it advance its 
projects, but as groups for self-expression, as places for knowledge and 
economic accumulation (Derclaye 1987:9). Further, the Margoas program  
envisions the functions of these organizations and its interactions with them as 
explained below.
The w ork of the program  begins by opening a dialogue udth the participants 
in an effective search for solutions to the farm ers' problems. Peasant organiza­
tions analyze their situation and prioritize their problems. They present these 
problem s and their proposed solutions to the program. The program  does its 
ow n analysis of the problems and either: a) agrees w ith the proposed solution, b) 
modifies the proposed solution, or c) presents a different solution altogether. If 
there is no complete agreem ent on the solutions, the peasants and the program
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personnel enter into a dialogue to achieve consensus on the best solution. After 
reaching agreement, the two parties get dow n to business, each providing its 
ow n resources. In short, indigenous organizations serve as forums for dialogue 
where farmers can express themselves, analyze and synthesize their experiences, 
and make decisions concerning the best courses of action to take for their collec­
tive benefit.
Indigenous organizations also serve to increase the farmers' management 
capacity as they assume responsibility to im plem ent the projects they have 
themselves initiated. Thus, the organization becomes the structure through 
which farm ers gain experience in "analysing situations, identifying problems and 
priorities, taking planning decisions in common, and carrying out" the activities 
(Derclaye 1987:19). Through this process, farmers leam  to achieve their own 
developm ent.
The Margoas program  does not conduct its ow n projects rather it acts as a 
provider of support services to the campesinos' projects. When the program 's 
views differ from those of the campesinos, it limits itself to advising farmers on 
possible solutions to their stated problems, or modifications to the solutions they 
have pu t forward. It is then the farm ers' themselves who decide whether or not 
to undertake a particular activity (Derclaye 1987:22). Of course, because, at least 
in the initial phases, the resources available to the campesinos are few, they 
depend on the program  to approve their initiatives in order to be able to carry 
them out, and in this sense, final decisions are taken jointly. Because of its posi­
tion as resource provider, there is an inherent danger that Margoas m ight at­
tem pt to direct the activities of campesinos. Here, Margoas needs to proceed 
cautiously and allow the campesino organizations as m uch latitude and auton­
omy as possible in order to live up  to its philosophy of allowing campesinos to 
practice their ow n development.
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Because campesinos are in control from the beginning, the Margoas pro­
gram, unlike other programs, does not need to preoccupy itself with the issue of 
gradual transfer of project control to the campesinos. Thus, as the program  
evolves, it is not the decision-making process that evolves, but the scope and 
complexity of the proposals presented and assum ed by the farmers' organiza­
tions (Derclaye 1987:22-23). As they become consolidated and strengthened 
institutionally, the farm ers' organizations increase their capacity to absorb and 
m anage outside inputs. Also, they should increasingly generate their own re­
sources, so that their need of the ADO is reduced over time.
In sum m arizing one of the major lessons learned in five years of operation, 
the M argoas Program  directors reiterate the essence of the program  itself:
The farm er is logical and his logic is internally consistent. Anyone who 
is not prepared to accept this logic will have to use pressure, con­
straints, artificial stimuli and install a supervisory organisation. This 
m eans a stül-bom  form of developm ent, because it denies the farm er 
the expression of his ow n wishes and keeps him the plaything of 
strategies which confirm his marginal and oppressed state (Derclaye 
1987:19).
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C o n c l u s i o n s
ADOs usually assume that if they leam  enough about the peasants' physical 
and  social environments they will be able to devise formulas to improve their 
lives. Learning about their conditions is a necessary but not sufficient step to 
help poor farmers in their developm ent efforts. It is very difficult to predict the 
outcomes of developm ent processes and pre-m ade "solutions" or those based 
on "sensitive consultation" often give rise to unexpected problems and difficul­
ties (Cox 1992:62). Besides, "solutions" form ulated by planners, even after they 
have received inputs from prospective beneficiaries, are not necessarily those the 
beneficiaries w ould either prefer or commit to, so that,
even w ith access to reasonably reliable information on rainfall, soil 
characteristics, crop yields, m arket prices, and the infrastructural re­
quirem ents of a proposed program , expert planners have no guaran­
tee that their goals will be acceptable—m uch less compelling—to the 
in tended beneficiaries. M ore often, program  designers cavalierly as­
sum e that beneficiaries will cooperate (Cox 1992:62).
In an effort to achieve this "cooperation" ADOs have, of late, attem pted to 
incorporate local participation into their projects. Unfortunately, because of their 
neo-patem alistic attitude, most ADOs see the extent of farmers' participation in a 
project as nothing m ore than consulting and involving them in its implementa­
tion. A ttem pting to increase community participation under this model is an ex­
pensive undertaking since it requires, som ewhat ironically, more involvement 
from the project staff. Cem ea points out that com munity involvement "requires 
m ore staff time for the diagnosis phase than conventional top-down planning, 
and  costlier logistical means" (1992:58) while Bhatnagar and Williams refer to the 
"high transaction costs to generate and sustain participatory approaches"
73
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(1992:4). These additional expenses discourage planners from starting or 
increasing community participation. O n the other hand, if participation is im­
plem ented as a developm ent process rather than  as one more element or input 
in the ADOs' projects, it implies no additional expenses (Derclaye 1987:14). On 
the contrary, developm ent program s that incorporate farmers as partners in 
developm ent can expect to have lower expenses because the farmers are more 
inclined to lend their resources and because no ADO efforts are spent in trying to 
determ ine the farm ers' needs and desires or in trying to m otivate them to 
"participate."
ADOs' concern w ith participation can be traced to their preoccupation with 
achieving "adoption" of their technologies. In their obsession with trying to 
change the behavior a n d /o r  beliefs of participants so as to enhance acceptance of 
their projects, ADOs waste m uch m oney and effort they could better use in pro­
viding im portant services to farmers. For example, it is estimated that it is much 
m ore expensive (up to fifteen times as m uch per beneficiary) to attem pt to 
change the behavior of beneficiaries than to provide them w ith information or 
educational material (Perrett 1982:33). But, even if beneficiaries are persuaded 
into cooperating w ith project planners, the consequences of outside projects 
m ost likely will not w ork in their favor if these projects attem pt to provide short 
term "fixes" instead of long term answers.
The type of com m unity participation practiced by ADOs is, of course, better 
than no participation, but it still has far to go toward addressing the problems of 
the rural poor. Com munity participation in ADOs' projects is generally too lim­
ited, but even if it were more extensive, it would still entail campesinos 
"participating" in somebody else's projects. It w ould stül leave the poor in basi­
cally the same situation, perhaps w ith a few more technical skills, but as unable 
to cope w ith the stifling forces in their hfe as before. While this model of partici-
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pation may provide short term results, it is counterproductive in the long run. 
ADOs should, instead, support farmers in their efforts to conceive, select, design 
and plan the projects they feel they need the most.
One of the m ajor recognitions derived from a five year study of two decades 
of developm ent assistance from ODCs to African countries (Lele and Jain 1992) is 
that agricultural economic growth can best be achieved by concentrating on 
long-term  strategies that support smaU-holder agriculture. Further, most suc­
cessful efforts tow ards the betterm ent of small farmers have supported the de­
velopm ent of "sustainable hum an, institutional, and technical capacity at the local 
level" (Lele and Jain 1992:581). Still, most donors during the past two decades fa­
vored short-term  solutions to alleviate w hat they perceived as "visible shortages 
of physical and social capital" (Lele and Jain 1992:581).
In a clear example of the constraints true developm ent faces, Stonich con­
cludes that the main single reason for poverty in H onduras is the lack of access 
to sufficient productive land (1992:395). Derclaye, speaking for the Margoas 
program , calls the issue of insufficient land "'the ' priority question" (1987:49). 
Therefore, program s that aim to alleviate rural poverty can only be effective if 
accompanied by greater access to land for all campesinos and increased off-farm 
em ploym ent opportunities for the landless. Moreover, the "considerable anti­
peasant biases in institutions, production, and marketing" need to be eliminated 
(Stonich 1992:395).
To summarize, the focus of ADOs on providing projects that attem pt to 
transfer technology by modifying attitudes and behavior even while using 
com m unity participation has proven quite ineffective in addressing the needs of 
the rural poor. This failure stems from two major characteristics of the current 
ADO approach. First, it is based on a form of neo-patem alism  that gives 
campesinos the role of supporting actors while project planners assume that of
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protagonists which, as seen throughout this paper, generally has negative con­
sequences. Also, it concentrates on developing technical and physical resources 
instead of hum an and institutional ones. Thus, the results do not lend them­
selves to long term sustainability as ADOs seem to be content with short term 
"success stories." These types of projects could have some justification if they 
were able to influence some of the larger factors that affect campesinos, but this 
is w here they actually faÜ the most.
Yudelman, former director of the Rural and Agricultural Development 
Program  of the W orld Bank concedes that, based on the Bank's experience, con­
ventional projects rarely influence changes in national policy because "even large 
projects represent lim ited interventions in a national setting" (1985:24). This is 
one of the m ain reasons for the inadequacy of technological projects in making 
significant advances tow ards alleviating poverty—they are simply not useful in 
affecting changes in policies that hu rt the poor and thus they m ust act within a 
context of economic policies that counteract their relative advantages. As a 
result, campesinos gain virtually nothing from projects, very little personal 
developm ent, and no im provem ent in the larger issues that affect them.
As currently designed and implemented, projects tend to actually underm ine 
the self-reliance of campesinos as they address only some of the symptoms of 
poverty and powerlessness but not the causes. Symptoms m ight need to be 
treated first, but as they w ork on enabling campesinos to address smaller prob­
lems, ADOs should also help them gain the ability to address larger ones. Poor 
farm ers need to be able to take an active thinking role in solving their own 
problems. They can start by having the opportunity to design their own pro­
jects. As they refine their social, political, and economic skills, that is, as they m a­
ture as a social group, they need to advance into making larger dem ands on 
their society.
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In o rder to have a real chance to come out of poverty and powerlessness, 
campesinos need to be "able to negotiate fairly their needs" (Annis 1992:15) in 
relation to those of other sectors of society who strive to control land and other 
natural resources. Even though they are the largest group in the H onduran 
society, they have the least negotiating pow er because of their poverty, and 
because u p  to now they have not used their real source of pow er—their 
num bers and cohesion—to its full potential. ADOs can play a significant role in 
this liberating process by abandoning their neo-patemalistic, project-based, 
technology transfer model and adopting one of cooperation and negotiation 
w ith rural farmers in a common search for solutions.
On the issue of independence and self-reliance, two comments sum up  the 
m ain points of this paper:
Elvia Alvarado, H onduran peasant leader:
We H ondurans are capable of doing anything, if we have the educa­
tion. But instead of teaching H ondurans, the governm ent brings in 
these foreign experts w ith their huge salaries. And we continue to be 
idiots. We d o n 't know how to adm inister our wealth, so people from 
other countries have to come to do it for us (1987:104).
A rural Indian:
We need outside help for analysis and understanding of our situation 
and experience, but not for telling us w hat we should do. An outsider 
who comes with ready-m ade solutions and advice is worse than use­
less. H e m ust first understand from us w hat our questions are, and 
help us articulate the questions better, and then help us find solutions. 
O utsiders also have to change. He alone is friend who helps us to 
think about our problem s on our ow n (Roy 1987:164).
Proponents of the present approach in rural developm ent might argue that, 
to ensure "success," more inform ation about the intended beneficiaries is needed 
before em barking on a project, more beneficiary input is needed while designing
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the project, and more com munity participation is needed while implementing 
the project. This paper has attem pted to dispute this notion and, while acknowl­
edging that these recom m endations may be a good start, the author contends 
that they do not go far enough in the pursuit of an im proved quality of Hfe for 
the rural poor. N ot untH ADO directors be wiUing to let go of their decision 
m aking pow er and their control over beneficiaries so as to allow them to take 
m atters into their ow n hands, will the rural poor truly be on their way to em an­
cipation.
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APPENDIX: THE DEVELOPMENT R AP
Excuse me.  Triends. 1 m u st  ca tc h  m y  j e t .
I'm ofT to join the Deve lopment  S e t .
My bags are packed, I have m y  s h o t s .  
Travel lers'  checks and pil ls  f o r  the t r o t s .
With passport ,  v i sas  and advanced d e g r e e s ,  
ni  get  those people ofT their knees.
I know the models ,  the a c r o n y m s ,  the  averags  
Now all it wil l  taka is t ime in the f ield.
yield;
'Banana Republ ic 's  w h e r e  I bought m y  clothes:
Got to make sure the image s h o w s .
These days w e  do without  the a ides  and lackeys .
A s  long as we're decked in the Right cu t  o f  khakis.
Development people are bright  and noble;
Our thoughts are deep,  our v is ion global .
We circulate only with the b e t te r  c l a s s e s .
Even though our thoughts a re  a l w a y s  w i t h  the m a s s e s .
In Sheraton Inns in s c a t t e r e d  nat ions  
We damn those mult i -national  cor po r at io ns .
Injustice s e e m s  e a s y  to p r o t e s t  
In such seething hotbeds o f  social  r e s t .
Polit ical  s y s t e m s  are ou t  o f  bounds;
My p r o f e ss o r  said; 'Keep your gy%s on the g r o u n d .  
Oppress ion.■ exploitation' are  w o r d s  not  uttered.  
You've got to remember  w h e r e  your bread  is buttered!'
We talk malnutrit ion over  s t eak
And plan hunger studies  on c o f f e e  br eak .
Whether Asian flood or Afr ican  drought .
We face any challenge wi th an open mouth
We bring In consultants w h o s e  c i rcumlocut ion  
Creates  a problem for e v e r y  solut ion;
Thus making sure  we  keep on eating  
By showing the ne«d for another  lunch meeting .
The language o f  the Development  S e t  
S t r e t c h e s  Ih.e English alphabet;
There are obfuscat ions like ' e p i g e n e t i c . '
'Micro, '  'm a cr o '  and ' l o g a r l t h m e t r l c . '
It p leases  us to be so e s o t e r ic ;
Intel lectual ly it's a tmospheric
The peasants  c a n t  understand our babble.
But w e r e  ' s l a t e - v f - t h o - a r t "  when it  c o m e s  to Scrab*. .
In the rural zone there w a s  basic subs i s tence .  
Adoption s t r a t e g i e s ,  and technical ass i s tan ce .
Then 'with ' i n t e g r a t e d '  and 'pa rt i c i p j t i cn . '
We Lh,ought there'd be en-yjjh to feed f htw ho^ e  nacon
When all those  ca tc hw or d s  didn't work cut 
Cur proposal s  bocan to lose their clout  
Grantsmanship is wa r ,  y e s  s iree!
Cur w o rd sm it h s  came up wiLh 'FS R-E ao a . '
When the talk gel's deep and you're feelir.a iumb 
You can keep your sham.e to a minimum.
To show that you.  too.  ore intell igent  
Smugly  ask,  'Is this de ve lopment? '
Or sa y .  'That's fine in pract i ce ,  but dont  you see;
It doesn't fit with the t h e e - o - r s e . '
To the man on the s t r e e t  incomprehensible.
In de\ elopm.ant-speak that's sensible .
Development homes  are  v e r y  chic,  
full  of  carv ings ,  curios ,  and draped batik.
Eye-leve l  photographs subt ly  assure
Your host  is at  home wi th the great  and the poor
There s a Volvo in the dr iveway  and a r t  on the wall 
But den t  ever  ask who pays for it all.
If Congress  g e t s  w is e  to the develupment racket  
Well need to declare in a lower tax bracket.
Liberals wring I hair hands at Communists.
The rednecks  think that bul l ets  work best .
We keep tell ing them development's the an sw er .
To bes t  confront  the Marxist  cancer.
If you get  depressed thinking all is lost .
Thank ycur s t a r s  fcr 'overhead cos ts ."
It builds our buildings and pays  our w ag es .
And helps us publish those r e a m s  o f  pages
The starving m a s s e s  are kept at bay.
You and I wil l  die and rot  some day.
For now keep in mind as you sip your beer  
Most o f  that foreign aid ends up here,
Enouoh o f  these  v e r s e s —on with the mission!
Cur task is as broad as the human condition 
Just  pray that the biblical ve r se  is true:
'The year y s  shall a l w a y s  have with you
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